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Abstract 
Redundancy allocation, in the context of reliability driven design, is the process of multi-
objective optimisation of system configuration with reliability and cost related objectives. 
Large systems, of any type and discipline, can be divided into several subsystems comprising 
modules and components. Such a hierarchical form of system arrangement is regarded as 
multilevel configuration.  These systems have the performance capability beyond traditional 
binary reliability framework of either completely working or totally failed. Large systems 
normally have redundancies at different levels. In current practice, multi-level redundancy 
allocation takes place sequentially.  This is mainly due to lack of a robust optimisation method 
capable of delivering large scale redundancy allocation problems. Development of such 
methods leads to design of enhanced systems with better performance in terms of cost and 
reliability. The overall aim of this project is to develop a method for multi-state reliability 
optimisation of large real-world systems. To achieve the overall goal, firstly, a genetic 
algorithm (GA) suitable for analysis of systems with multi-level redundancies is developed. 
For this GA, new multi-level chromosome, new crossover and mutation operators capable of 
combining building blocks at different level and mutation of solutions at various levels are 
designed. Whilst the GA chromosome and regeneration operators are specially designed for 
handling multi-level systems, in the second step a Non-dominated sorted genetic algorithm 
(NSGA-II) is developed for multi-dimensional search towards finding Pareto frontier solutions 
with respect to a number of cost-related, performance-related and reliability-rated objectives 
including cost, size, weight, availability and failure rate. In the final stage, the developed search 
and optimisation methods are implemented in a software tool written in MATLAB. Employing 
the optimisation tool for benchmark problems with multi-level redundancies, heating, 
ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems, it has been shown how an integrated multi-
level redundancy allocation, as opposed to sequential redundancy allocation, can lead to 
superior solutions. 
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Notations 
   A           Module. 
<n, m>        Min/Max number of module components. 
         Module A1 with min/max components.  
            Indicates the presence of system branch or sub-branch. 
 𝑈𝑆          System level 
 𝑅𝑖         Reliability of 𝑈𝑖 
𝑈𝑖         i-th unit; a common name for system, module and component.  
𝑈𝑖,𝑚
𝑗
          j –th redundant unit of m-th sub-unit of 𝑈𝑖 
𝑅𝑖,𝑚
𝑗
         Reliability of 𝑈𝑖,𝑚
𝑗
 
 𝑥𝑖         Number of components used in unit 𝑈𝑖 
 𝑅𝑖(x𝑖)         Reliability of subsystem 𝑖 
 𝑛𝑖         Number of sub-units in 𝑈𝑖 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A1 <n, m> 
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Acronym 
ASS   Availability of a system steady state 
DFM   Double failure matrix 
DM   Decision maker 
FR   Failure rate 
GA   Genetic algorithm 
HGA   Hierarchical genetic algorithm 
Iff                                If and only if 
MDT   Mean down time 
MFOP   Maintenance free operating period 
MLF   Multilevel formulation 
MLMOR2  Multilevel multi-objective redundancy optimisation 
MTBF   Mean time between failure 
MTBM  Mean time between maintenance 
MTTF   Mean time to failure 
ngen   number of generation 
npop     Number of population 
NSGA-II  Non-dominated sorted genetic algorithm 
pc   probability of crossover 
PFD   Probability of success or probability of failure on demand 
pm   probability of mutation 
RAP   Redundancy allocation problem 
RBD   Reliability block diagram 
VEGA   Vector evaluated genetic algorithm 
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1. Introduction  
Properly designed systems are mostly justified through their operational capabilities. Such 
systems operational capabilities have the tendency to successfully execute tasks in time, and 
under optimal performance without failing. No system is practically designed not to fail. 
However, failure of any system without accomplishing its assigned task defines such system 
not only nonperforming and unreliable, but also a risk to safety assurance. Safety prevents 
systems from causing injury to persons, or significant material damage during its use. A good 
system is a one designed with safety assurance. Therefore, every safety assured system is 
usually subjected to safety evaluation. That is, to evaluate safety that encompasses the 
following aspects: safety when the system is functional and is correctly operated and safety 
when the system or part of it has failed. The former is concerned with accident prevention, for 
which a large number of regulations exists both nationally and internationally. The later aspect 
deals with that of technical safety which is usually checkmated in five steps (identification of 
potential hazards, identification of their causes, determination of their effect, classification of 
their effect, and investigation of all possibilities to avoid hazard). Considering similar tools 
with respect to reliability is however different, and literally very necessary to establish the 
distinction between safety and reliability. Safety deals with measures that allow a system to be 
brought into a safe state in the case of failure (fail-safe behaviour), while reliability is concerned 
with performance measures aimed at minimizing failures. This is based on the fundamental 
belief that a system is said to be reliable and safe only if it is able to successfully execute a 
given task within a given time frame without failures. Failures can lead to loss of lives, lost 
production, or can even be costly due to damage to components in several industries including 
but not limited to the oil and gas, and aerospace industries (Branimir et al., 2016). For oil and 
gas industry, particularly production systems, major component failures amount to lost time, 
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and can also lead to loss of lives if harmful chemicals are released into the atmosphere. Such a 
scenario is similar in the aerospace industry where the cost of failure is also predominant, and 
in most cases it becomes highly impossible to recover. Therefore, the practice of reliability on 
systems remains an issue of concern in the engineering industries which are targeted at 
addressing failure criticality alongside with the costs associated.  
To design a reliable system capable of performing highly and at the same time guarantee safety 
is therefore important. In a nutshell, reliability, performance and safety are very fundamental 
objectives to consider in the engineering design and they deserve to be well understood. Having 
stated the safety concept and defined reliability above, performance on the other hand is 
characterised by the amount of useful work accomplished by the system. In most cases however, 
system performance can settle at binary state; that is either performing or failed depending on 
the type of system and the nature of design implemented on it. For other systems such as power 
generation, HVAC, flight control system and oil and gas transportation, the overall 
performance can settle on different levels (e.g. 100%, 80%, and 50% nominal capacity). 
Therefore, to have a reliability driven system that can perform optimally and safely the design 
objectives must begin at the early design stage where all the necessary factors such as design 
approach and design parameters are suitably dealt with. Objectives that drive design could be 
conflicting in most cases and the ability to trade-off the conflicts results in good system design.  
For instance, a design could be driven by reliability as the main objective with other assessment 
criteria, including the cost, as the secondary objectives given the potential cases; (i) when a 
failure leads to huge financial loss or human lives and (ii) in case of dealing with a great deal 
of uncertainties in modelling and evaluation.  
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1.1 Basic Quantitative Reliability Requirements 
Quantitative reliability requirements in engineering systems for example HVAC and Flight 
Control systems are mainly based on reaching high availability targets. Given this, a small risk 
of failure associated with occurrence of premature failure is hardly guaranteed. At a very high 
availability, the probability of a premature failure can lead to an increase in cost of the failure 
or total loss of the system (warranty cost for example). Overall, reliability requirements must 
endeavour to guarantee not only a high availability target, but also a low probability of 
premature failure.  
Considering cost, it is normally a factor often considered as one assessment criteria in terms of 
price for the achievement of a desired reliability level of a given system. This can represent an 
allocated capital cost (budget) which involves the cost of implementing and operating a 
program, which is normally in addition to the overall development and production cost 
associated with the system. It literally consists of direct material and labour costs as well as 
indirect costs such as, taxes, insurance, energy, production facilities and equipment. Other costs 
are overheads such as administrative, marketing and product development costs. With regards 
to capital cost, it is generally (but not always) an increasing function of reliability. However, 
capital cost can be viewed as an investment for achievement of a desired system reliability. 
This is largely so because organisations that put more resources into a system expect a better 
reliability result. Cost and reliability can therefore be expressed mathematically to show their 
relationship. 
Mathematically, overall system reliability  𝑅𝑠 , is related to component reliabilities  𝑅𝑖  , 
through a function given by; 
                                   𝑅𝑠 = 𝑅1 ×  𝑅2  ×  𝑅3 × … × 𝑅𝑚                                                                   (1.1) 
where 𝑅1, 𝑅2, 𝑅3, … , 𝑅𝑚  are reliability of the system components. 
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(Where 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑀 number of components in a system) 
Assume 𝐶𝑖𝑅𝑖 ,  to be the cost of component  𝑖 , with reliability  𝑅𝑖 , implying that the cost 
increases with increasing component reliability. So the total system cost 𝐶𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  can be 
demonstrated as;  
               𝐶𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙            = ∑ 𝐶𝑖(𝑅𝑖)
𝑀
𝑖=1
                                                                                      (1.2) 
Considering the relationships in Equations 1.1 and 1.2, the common objectives of already 
established reliability optimisation approaches term to be: 
 For a pre-defined level of system reliability, minimize the total cost of resources 
required to attain a desired reliability level. 
 For a given budget allocated for a particular project, achieve maximum level of system 
reliability. 
As regards to the first case, the objective is to determine the optimal reliability allocation such 
that the reliability of the system 𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑛, and the total system cost 𝐶𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 are minimised. Based on 
this, the following optimisation problem becomes: 
  
 
 


M
i
ii
R
RCJ
M
11
min                                                                (1.3) 
   subject to the constraints   
    (𝑅1 ×  𝑅2  ×  𝑅3, … , 𝑅𝑀)  ≥ 𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑛                                                                                              (1.4) 
where, 
    {𝑅𝑠}1
𝑀         =        {𝑅1 , 𝑅2, 𝑅3, … , 𝑅𝑀}                                                                                         (1.5) 
      
5 
 
As regards to the second case, the objective requires the designer to determine the optimal 
reliability allocation that maximises the system reliability  𝑅𝑠, subject to the overall cost 𝐶 
not exceeding some Pre-specified budget value  𝐶𝑀𝑎𝑥 . Then, the optimisation problem 
appears in the following:  
 
),...,××(max 321
1
M
R
RRRRJ
M
                                            (1.6) 
Subject to the constraints  
∑ 𝐶𝑖(𝑅𝑖)
𝑀
𝑖=1
 ≤ 𝐶𝑀𝑎𝑥                                                                                                               (1.7) 
                               𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ                    0 ≤ 𝑅𝑖 ≤ 1 . 
 
1.2 Generalised Approach of Reliability Goals 
Establishment 
Konya (2012) stated that establishing reliability goals is a crucial aspect of achieving and 
maintaining acceptable reliability performance. They are developed to: 
 Establish product-level reliability specifications that if met, shall directly ensure 
that the reliability performance of the product will meet the customer’s functional 
needs and be consistent with other product constraints. 
 Allocate the product –level reliability requirements down to the level needed (for 
example, subsystems, equipment or assembly level) in order to be very meaningful 
to the design engineers. 
These goals are however in contrast with reliability requirements. Whilst reliability 
requirements remain the minimum level of performance expected by the customer, reliability 
goals deal with higher level reliability that surpasses reliability requirement of a system. This 
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may result in one or more of the following benefits: a greater market share (i.e., a situation 
where reliability takes a centre stage and obviously becomes a discriminator among products), 
lower life cycle cost for the customer, lower supplier cost (fewer returns and lower warranty 
costs), and less risk of reliability and litigation (safety cases). Ideally, reliability requirements 
and goals are normally defined clearly prior to the beginning of the design or product 
development circle. This is to address the resemblance of these two objectives (requirements 
and goals). At the initial design stage, requirements may be stated as “goals” depending on 
when firm requirements can be defined as the design matures. Additionally, reliability goals 
and requirements can be based on customers’ preferences. Alternatively, it can be on internally 
developed strategies to position new systems in the open market environment (i.e., competitive 
advantage through reliability benchmarking). Reliability requirements and goals are, over time, 
kept in check in order to realise them within schedule constraints and budget. The following 
are fundamental to realise reliability goals and requirements: 
 Modelling and Simulation 
 Benchmarking  
 Fault tolerance 
 Environmental Characterization and 
 Durability Assessment.  
 Model-based and observer-based fault detection. 
Model-based and observer-based fault detection method uses the dynamical model of the 
system to generate signals (called residual signal) to give an indication whether a fault has 
occurred in the system (Ding et al., 2016). Here in this work, the candidate shall not be 
concerned with the aforementioned method. Rather, the candidate shall concentrate on using 
MATLAB program for successful delivery of this work. 
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1.3 Research Aim and Objectives 
The overall aim of this research is to establish a method for multi-state reliability optimisation 
of large real-world systems where an integrated method for multi-level redundancy allocation 
of such systems is realised. These systems normally have redundancies at different levels. Upon 
realisation of this aim, the aforementioned systems performance are maximised, their failure 
rates, weights and costs, depending on the objectives, are minimised (Zhigang & Ming Zuo, 
2006). Recent research carried out in this area mainly proposed a multi-objective optimisation 
model for sequential redundancy allocation. This model can be time consuming and solutions 
achieved through this model are usually not optimal.  
1.3.1 Research Objectives 
Objective 1- Development of a genetic algorithm (GA) suitable for analysis of systems with 
multi-level redundancies 
This is to technically avoid using the conventional method of chromosome definition for 
systems with multi-level redundancies, because it leads to very long chromosomes for real-life 
systems. Such long chromosomes usually have a diverse effect on the performance of a GA in 
optimal redundancy allocation.  
Therefore, a suitable GA for multi-level reliability systems should have the following 
characteristics: 
i. Multi-level chromosome representing systems with multi-redundancies. 
ii. A new crossover operator capable of combining building blocks at different levels. 
iii. A new mutation operator capable of muting a solution at various levels.  
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Objective 2 – Development of multi-objective codes suitable for multi-level systems and 
tailoring of the GA operators developed in objective 1 into a higher GA level called a non-
dominated sorted genetic algorithm (NSGA-II) for size optimisation. 
Objective 3 – Formulation of typical systems with multilevel redundancies, applicable to 
large real-world systems such as flight control systems (FCS), hybrid renewable energy 
systems (HRES), and heating ventilation and air-conditioning systems (HVAC). 
Objective 4 - Run case studies towards evaluating the performance of different systems 
designed using traditional binary-state methods and new multilevel formulation method.  
1.4 Original Contribution to Knowledge 
This project contribution to knowledge is the development of a suitable method for multi-state 
reliability optimisation as opposed to the traditional binary performance case. Development of 
such a method leads to design of enhanced systems with better performances with respect to 
both reliability and cost. Integrated multi-level redundancy allocation is an additional 
contribution of this project to knowledge, hence it is less time consuming as opposed to the 
sequential method mentioned earlier. Moreover, the GA operators are innovative and can 
combine building blocks at different levels.  
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
The rest of the thesis is structured in the following ways: 
Chapter two deeply emphasized on maintenance and maintainability importance of typical real-
life systems. Various parameters used for measuring reliability of such systems were analysed. 
The chapter extensively discussed on reliability concepts to show that reliability drive design 
is a function of time. In general, reliability of systems is more effective at their early stage of 
life but decreases with time due to component aging, failure and the use of substandard 
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materials during design stages. Since addressing unreliability is one of the concerns in the 
engineering field, the chapter established that a good design approach capable of addressing 
physics of failures at every design stage should be adopted. Furthermore, the chapter elaborated 
on various ways systems can fail and what leads to system failure. Often the cause of failure 
originates from system faults and progressively results in system failure if not promptly 
identified and fixed. Finally, the chapter showcased up to date types of system configurations 
and modern analysis techniques by which systems can be effectively analysed, alongside ways 
in which system design for reliability can be actualised. 
Chapter three of the thesis is structured to critically explore redundancy allocation problems 
(RAPs). RAPs are generally a multi-objective optimisation problem (MOOP), so the chapter 
addressed RAPs with the MOOP approach. Apart from that, the chapter presented a variety of 
approaches and techniques of MOOP and established that the NSGA-II method was most 
suitable to adopt for successful delivery of this project as the approach is flexible, gives a better 
spread of solutions, gives a good level of convergence and can allow room for solution 
improvement. 
In Chapter four, solutions to RAPs were provided and analysed against the traditional approach 
where redundancies were allocated on systems sequentially. The new approach is efficient and 
is referred to as an integrated approach and enables redundancies to be allocated on systems 
automatically without limitations on either of the system levels (i.e., components, module, 
branch, sub-branch and system). 
Chapter five presents the usability of the MATLAB software development tool used in this work 
with its functionalities explained. The chapter shows that MATLAB is a prolific software tool 
for technical project delivery. From projects conceptual stage, particularly projects involving 
Series-Parallel systems, the tool enables the designer to configure design candidates in 
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accordance with specification to produce the desired output. The program worked efficiently 
well with a very short run time required to produce desired outputs or solutions. In this case, 
desired outputs were shown in two phases: 
 Showing system topology levels with integrated allocated redundant components which 
outweighs the traditional design approach on the redundancy allocation problem  
 Showing the multi-objective results on the Pareto frontier for decision making. 
Chapter Six showcased various case studies proving successful application of the written 
NSGA-II codes which includes the following: 
 Optimisation of fuel oil system design with creation of more redundancies up to 
multilevel using NSGA-II system configuration mechanism. 
 Increasing Series systems overall topology level by incorporating redundancies at all 
levels with coded solution version provided and analysed.  
Chapter seven is conclusions and recommendations. 
  
11 
 
2. Reliability Driven Design 
Concepts and Analysis Methods 
 
2.1 Basic Reliability Concepts 
Reliability concept is very important for many industries. The concept further took pervasive 
dimension, as a fundamental measure and practice worthy of both qualitative and quantitative 
connotations (Marseguerra & Zio, 2009). Interestingly, reliability is mainly concerned with 
dependability in the life cycle management of systems. In other words, the probability that a 
system will perform properly under a given operating time, t, (Lewis E.E., 1996).  Reliability 
of a system is a function of time, 𝑅(𝑡),  and as earlier stated, it is concerned with dependability 
and excellent performance that enables the principle necessitate: a dynamic and probabilistic 
framework. It is measurable in terms of a probability,  𝑃(𝑇 > 𝑡) that a system or a component 
will continue to function optimally under a defined time interval,  𝑡  prior to failing eventually 
in time  𝑇, such that  𝑇, is regarded as a continuous random variable. 𝑇 > 𝑡. For this purpose, 
it is known as survival of function (Kaufmann et al., 1977).  
 𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑃(𝑇 > 𝑡)                                                                                                                   (2.1) 
The relationship above is restricted to the time interval of the system initial failure for non-
repairable systems, whilst all total time intervals between successive failures must be 
considered for repairable systems. Overall, the reliability function is treated as a monotone 
decreasing function with an appreciable unity life at the start, which reduces gradually towards 
zero as the time increases to infinity.   
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The component of 𝑅(𝑡), from the above Equation (2.1) is the cumulative distribution function 
of failures 𝐹(𝑡), and is linked with reliability in accordance with the relationship below. 
 𝐹(𝑡) = 1 − 𝑅(𝑡)                                                                                                                  (2.2) 
Similar to the adopted approach in Equation(2.2) , and continuous random variable 𝑇 , the 
 𝐹(𝑡) gives the probability that the time to failure  𝑇  will be smaller than the specific time  𝑡 ,
 𝐹(𝑡) = 𝑃(𝑇 ≤ 𝑡)                                                                                                                   (2.3) 
The probability density function of failure time, or the time to failure is denoted by 𝑓(𝑡), and 
it normally describes the spreading nature of failure probability. In the infinitesimal interval 
 𝑡 , 𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡, probability of failure is defined as 𝑓(𝑡)𝑑𝑡, while for any specified interval of time 
𝑡1 ≤ 𝑇 ≤ 𝑡2, failure probability can be estimated as: 
 𝑃(𝑡1 ≤ 𝑇 ≤ 𝑡2) =  ∫ 𝑓(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡1
                                                                                          (2.4) 
The reason is because 𝑓(𝑡), is a probability distribution whose values are always non-negative, 
and the total area beneath  𝑓(𝑡), is always equal to one. Also, 𝑓(𝑡), has a relationship with the 
cumulative distribution function 𝐹(𝑡),  as shown below;  
 𝑓(𝑡) =
𝑑𝐹(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
                                                                                                                          (2.5) 
Further fundamental discussions relating to basic reliability concepts, technicality and the 
applicable mathematics can be found in (Technical Manual 5-698-1, 2007 & Vayrynen et al., 
2011). 
2.2 Safety Systems 
The ideal concept of safety systems is to develop a system free from danger to both 
environment and human life (Story, 1996). This concept has two fundamental requirements: a 
functional and non-functional requirement that assesses its dependability and design. The 
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functional requirement deals with activities that allow the system to execute its intended 
function, while the non-functional requirement deals with the basic properties such as size, 
weight, maintainability and many more characteristics a system should possess for adequate 
performance. Non-functional Requirements (NFRs) may have a profound impact on system 
architecture, hardware and software development process and may even impact functional 
safety (Petrov et al., 2013). Almost all industries have safety challenges; they regard such 
challenges as serious and critical because the challenge increases as technology evolves. One 
such example is an aircraft or nuclear power plant that overtime evolves and causes a hazard 
as a result of a safety gap (Acharyulu, 2015). These aforementioned systems can fail and their 
failure is often accompanied with consequences leading to loss of life, property destruction, 
financial loss and environmental harm. However safety dependency on systems can be said to 
be less absolute, hence no best design approach has been found to address safety gaps 
completely. Instead, safe systems only minimise a hazard, failure and the acts leading to failure 
which includes human errors (Naderpour et al., 2015). Since the key to system safety has to do 
with the ability to successfully manage hazards, achieving success therefore involves 
systematic approach to the management of risk where all hazard can be tracked continually 
until acceptable closure action is verified and implemented as shown in Figure 2-1. 
 
 
Figure 2-1 Systematic Approach to System Safety (Ericson, 2005) 
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2.3 System Hazard 
Hazard on systems can be conceptualised as a source of energy that can be potentially released 
to cause injury especially in a work environment. Storey (1996) referred to a hazard as the 
occurrence of an unintended event or sequence of events that causes death, injury, and 
environment or material damage. However, there is one fundamental hazard-related concept 
that seems conflicting in the management of hazards known as mishap. Hazards and mishaps 
are at the opposite ends of the same entity. As stated earlier, a hazard is a potential event while 
a mishap is actual an event informed by a hazard. A hazard is predictable and can be managed 
effectively (Cheng-Wu et al., 2012). There are different types of hazards such as natural, 
technological and societal hazards (Martina et al., 2015) and an adequate model and estimation 
can be found (Nima et al., 2009). 
2.4 System Fault 
Fault and failure have one feature in common which is that they both can obstruct safety of 
system. In addition, can affect efficiency and performance of a system. A fault can be said to 
be deviational and in many possible cases, does not keep a system out of operation. For failure, 
it is a permanent deviation that keeps a system out of operation until repairs are carried out.  A 
fault has the capacity to initiate a system failure if not detected early and fixed. A Fault could 
be hidden and difficult to detect because it occurs independently on a system without regards 
to the system state, whether the system is in operation or not. Often it occurs in various forms: 
design faults, manufacturing faults, assembling faults, normal operation faults, maintenance 
faults, hardware faults, software faults etc. However, system faults can be diagnosed in order 
not to initiate system failure through a procedure that includes two fundamental steps: fault 
detection and fault localization (Maitreya & Adershpal, 2007). Lu Lu et al., (2013) explained 
that fault detection particularly identifies fault occurrence on systems. In this step, detection 
tools are adopted to detect the presence of system faults and whether faults truly exist. Where 
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faults exist, then fault localization is subsequently triggered to identify the exact fault domain 
and reason why the fault existed. Since fault detection is the first key step in performance of 
fault diagnosis on a system, ensuring accurate fault detection methods such as the classical 
fault detection method and passive fault detection method, amongst others, is therefore 
fundamental.  
2.5  System Failure  
While failure remains a permanent deviation that keeps systems out of operation until repairs 
are carried out, it is also one of the acceptable measures for reliability. The rate at which a 
system fails determines if such a system can be reliably enough to finish an assigned task within 
a time frame. In some cases, a system that fails recursively is either aging or designed with 
sub-standard materials. Two types of failures are well established in the literature: Common 
cause and Independent failures. Common cause failures are failures of multiple components 
due to a shared root cause (Wang et al, 2014; Rejc & Marko, 2014; and Ramirez-Marquez & 
David, 2007), while independent failures are failures of a single component which does not 
affect other system components from continuing in its functional state. Furthermore, the 
probability of failure helps to estimate accurate engineering design points (Cho, 2013). For this 
purpose, two reliability methods: First Order-Reliability Method (FORM) and Second Order 
Reliability Method (SORM) are applied. FORM attempts to approximate failure probability 
through linearization of the limit- state surface (the boundary of the failure domain) at design 
point, while SORM uses quadratic surface fitted at the design point to effect the improvement 
(Kiureghian & Dakessian, 1998), and tries to identify failures.  
2.5.1 Causes of Failure on a System 
The cause of components failure especially in the case of flight control systems, mechanical 
and most electronic systems can vary. In most cases the components of these systems fail when 
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(i) they are exposed to a high temperature, (ii) loads applied exceeds its strength, or as a result 
of aging and many more. Alternatively, failure can be characterised by the following factors:  
 Problems in part design or manufacturing,  
 Problems in the system design or assembly  
 Incorrectly performed repairs, and  
 Wear out resulting from cumulative usage of the system (Tsai-Ching & Wojtek, 2010). 
The first category occurs early in the life of a component and their frequency, called failure 
rate (FR) or hazard rate, tends to decrease over time. Failure analysis can be done through 
modelling and identification of failure portions of a system under operating condition as 
depicted in Figure 2-2.   
                  
Figure 2-2- Bathtub curve FR model (Crowe et al., 2000).        
The curve is segmented into three periods: infant mortality, steady-state and wear out. The 
infant mortality period objectifies a small portion of population with initial high failure 
probability as a result of possible manufacturing defects that failed to show-up immediately 
during screening. The steady-state period represents a failed population with a constant FR, 
and the wear out period represents the end of life, and occurs when the failure increases in time. 
Failure is difficult to completely designed out from systems. For this reason, every system is 
therefore prone to failure. Failure occurrence literally has unavoidable effects on systems. To 
address failure effect, particularly the common cause failure with the potential of triggering, 
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failure at all levels has been handled (Chen et al., 2015). Failures caused by common internal 
cause are referred to as propagated failures and can be easily classified as local failures on the 
component. In general, system can fail safely or dangerously. Failure that occurs safely is 
otherwise known as fail-safe, while failure that occurs dangerously is referred to as fail-to 
danger as detailed below.  
2.5.2 Failure to Danger versus Failure to Safety  
Failure to danger is catastrophic, the consequences are always capable of subjecting systems 
to extreme destruction. Often cases of failure to danger lead to loss of lives and valuable 
properties. On the other hand, failure to safety neither results in loss of lives nor in loss of 
valuable properties. Failure to safety is basically failure detected ahead of time, thereby 
allowing time for precautionary measures to be taken in order to modify the design for the 
purposes of reducing the failure probability and its effect from failing to danger. Figure 2-3 is 
divided into two portion (A & B) illustrating failure to danger and failure to safety of a system 
with components. The system components include bellows, spring, pivot and indicator. The 
indicator in portion “A” of Figure 2-3 indicates that the system has zero pressure, which is 
normally hazardous if undetected whilst portion B shows that the system is pressurised. 
 
Figure 2-3-system for failure analysis of fail-safe and fail to danger conditions (Maheri 2013). 
 
Furthermore, Figure 2-3-1 failed to safety after the system bellows broke down, indicator 
shows zero pressure whereas the system is pressurised, while Figure 2-3-2 failed to danger as  
Bellows 
Spring 
Pivot 
Indicator 
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a result of fractured spring and indicator shows a pressurised system even when the system 
pressure is zero. 
            
       Figure 2-3-1 Failure to safety.         Figure 2-3-2 Failure to danger (Maheri 2013) 
               
Failure impacts on systems generally challenge reliability their position and can actually be 
prevented for better reliability (Keren et al., 2003), and also act as better risk management for 
a safety system (Pittiglio et al., 2014). Therefore, to prevent failure and make systems safer 
and reliable, the designers can also do the following:  
 Redesign the system for “passive” improvement of reliability and safety. 
 Identify possible points where the system component is most likely to compromise 
system operation, resulting in injuries and other losses. 
 Carefully evaluate the effects of component failures on the system performance. 
 Identify components that are critical to safety and 
 Improve maintenance routines to reduce the likelihood of component failures. 
2.5.3 Fundamental Measures for Reliability 
Apart from FR, other ways of measuring reliability of a system include: 
 Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) 
 Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) 
 Maintenance Free Operating Period (MFOP) 
 Probability of Success or Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD) 
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FR, MTTF and MTBF are time dependent reliability measures that are usually applied to 
systems that operate on a regular basis. FR clearly specifies number of failures on an hourly 
basis, the more failure is consistently specified, the less reliable such a system becomes, while 
the lesser the failure rate the more reliable the system becomes. Reliability is therefore 
increased with decrease in FR.  
MTTF is the equivalent measure for non-repairable items, and can be referred to as the 
reciprocal of hazard rate (Paul & David, 2012). For MTBF, reliability is increased as MTBF 
increases and MTBF is usually specified in hours. However, MTBF can be impossible to 
predict if the time to failure distribution is not exponential (Dinesh Kumar et al., 1999). In 
addition, MFOP currently represents one of the newest concepts designed to measure reliability 
particularly in the aerospace industry where dependence on MTBF can be reduced and specify 
reliability as a probability of time in service prior to failure (Dinesh Kumar et al., 1999). One 
of the advantages is that it can track behaviour of a system throughout the life of the system. 
PFD is mainly used for single-shot systems such as automobile airbags and fire extinguishers. 
It is specified as dimensionless probability or a percentage known as system safety engineering. 
These measures are mathematically modelled in (Lewis, 1996; Xie and Zheng, 2009) to 
account for detail knowledge of basic reliability calculations that conformed reliability practice 
as a function of time; for example, 𝑅(𝑡) = 1 − 𝐹(𝑡). 
2.6 System Availability Circle 
Availability is a key component in reliability. It is regarded as a percentage of time that a system 
will be operationally viable to carry out its required function(s), which is mostly applicable to 
systems that operate continuously. It is mostly referred to as “five Nines availability”, which 
represents (99.999%) of a system available state. Two important states that make up availability 
circle are failure and repairs. These states are in addition regarded as a prudent availability 
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concept. Based on the concept, a failure is followed by a repair and repair time normally puts 
system in an unavailable state as a result of down time. 
There are different types of availability that further define system state and time. They include 
operational, intrinsic and steady state availabilities. First, operational availability takes into 
account administrative procedure times. Secondly, intrinsic availability excludes from 
consideration all other times in product or system lifecycle such as: accident management time, 
storage time, administrative or logistic time, and conforms to probability that a system can 
operate satisfactorily under given conditions (Houssin & Coulibaly, 2014). Finally, a steady 
state availability uses useful parameters to describe the amount of system available time (Wei 
et al., 2014). Steady state availability (Ass) and downtime (DT) are commonly used in practice 
in availability metrics. The mathematical expression of steady state availability is expressed in 
availability measures in Equation 2.8 overleaf, and is widely accepted in practice (Hairong & 
Jame, 2002). Interestingly, availability is one of the most fascinating characteristics of a 
repairable system (Maciejewski & Caban, 2008). It complements the fundamental basis for 
which system maintainability exists in the first place, since maintainability is a practice that 
enhances a system that is out of operation to be restored. In a nutshell, maintainability can 
predict how quickly and economically system operation can be restored so as to keep the 
system in an available state. With respect to these characteristics, system inherent 
availability(𝐴i) which is an important performance index for a repairable system, is usually 
estimated from the times-between-failures and the times-to-restore data (Wang & Dimitri, 
2000). The estimation is then defined in Equation 2.7 which also reflects percentage of time a 
system would be available if delays due to maintenance, logistics and supply are ignored. 
2.6.1 System Unavailability Estimation  
A system can be unavailable due to latent failure that is yet to be detected, or it can be 
unavailable due to ongoing corrective and preventive maintenance of the system. So for non-
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repairable systems or components, availability is equal to reliability. In other words, the 
probability that a system or component is available at time  (𝑡) is equal to the probability that 
it has not failed between  0 and 𝑡: 
 𝐴(𝑡) = 𝑅(𝑡)                                                                                                                        (2.6)   
For a repairable system with ignored maintenance delayed time, the estimation of availability 
can be demonstrated as: 
              𝐴𝑖 =
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹 + 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅         
× 100%                                                                                       (2.7) 
However, in cases where the system never failed, the 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹 becomes inestimable and  𝐴𝑖 
would be 100%. 
In contrast, for systems that repair processes are not ignored, the steady state availability  (𝐴𝑠𝑠) 
is applied (Enrico Zio, 2007).   
 𝐴𝑠𝑠 =
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹+𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅         
                                                                                             (2.8)    
𝐴𝑠𝑠 represents the system availability, 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹  represents the mean time to failure, and 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 
represents mean time to recovery (or repair). Also, Equation 2.9 shows that availability is a 
function of uptime and downtime.   
     𝐴 =
𝑈𝑃 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 
𝑈𝑝 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 +  𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
                                                                                     (2.9) 
Uptime is the time in which the system is available for use, while downtime is the time in which 
the system is unavailable for use. The sum of uptime and downtime is equal to the total system 
run time. 
Availability normally depends on reliability and maintainability, and operational availability is 
a function of active maintenance time as well as administrative delay and logistic delay time. 
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A concrete expression for operational availability is by the mean time between maintenance 
(MTBM) and the mean downtime (MDT) for each maintenance action. This similar expression 
was given in (Song et al., 2012) as: 
𝐴𝑜 =
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑀
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑀 + 𝑀𝐷𝑇
                                                                                                                       (2.10) 
Notably, the known established availability expression in Equation (2.8) does not hold ‘per se’ 
for redundant systems as failure rate under redundant systems are not constant but vary. 
However, for Equation (2.8) to hold validly for redundant systems, then  𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹 and 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 
must be replaced by its equivalent, by ensuring that both are the inverse of the failure rate when 
failure rate is constant as shown below.  
  𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹 & 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹 =
1
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒
                                                                          (2.11)           
 
To further simplify Up Time and Down Time from Equation (2.9), let   𝑇𝑝 be the preventive 
maintenance time interval. This time can vary because an occurrence of a failure and the 
maintenance duration are random (Van der weide & Pandey, 2015), so for this purpose, several 
components can have different  𝑇𝑝 (Tsai et al., 2004). Let; 
        𝜇𝑚 be the mean time for minimal repair of the component 
       𝜇  be the mean time to repair of the component 
      𝜆(𝑡) be the hazard (failure rate) of the component 
Then UP Time and Down Time can be derived using similar expressions in Equations 14 and 
15 of (Tsai et al., 2004) where: 
  Up Time = 𝑇𝑝 − 𝜇𝑚 ∫ 𝜆(𝑡)𝑑𝑡                                                                                              ( 2.12) 
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 Down Time = 𝜇 + 𝜇𝑚 ∫ 𝜆(𝑡)𝑑𝑡                                                                                            (2.13) 
Whilst extended reliability modelling insights, especially for the derivation of 𝜆(𝑡), can be 
found in Maxim Finkelstein (2008), system unavailability is shown to be; 
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝐷𝑇) = (1 − 𝐴𝑠𝑠) ∗ 8760 ∗ 60      Downtime in minutes per year           (2.14)   
To ascertain the usefulness of the explored measures above, many authors including (Ahmed 
et al., 2014; Cekyay & Ozekici, 2015) have done work using this simple and efficient approach 
for availability analysis. And more excellent availability measures comprising mathematical 
models of different systems are provided in (Chandrupatla, 2009; Sheng & Dhillon, 2011), 
proving that availability is estimated with full consideration of reliability and maintainability. 
In fact, by designing for appropriate achievement of availability and ensuring appropriate 
statistical calculations are entrenched, a very good maintenance programme can be achieved. 
2.7 System Maintenance 
Effective system maintenance is widely viewed as one of the major challenges confronting 
many industries and organisations, especially if the goal is to provide services at a higher 
competence level. Based on these challenging issues, many industries have placed a high 
priority on preventive maintenance to ensure system reliability level is satisfactory. 
Maintenance objectives are mainly achieved by staving off aging effects of wear, corrosion, 
fatigue, and related phenomena of such from systems through either one or both of the most 
popular maintenance types: preventive maintenance (PM) and corrective maintenance (CM). 
Preventive maintenance tends to avoid the failure occurrence of a system and reduces the 
potential failure consequences (Selvik & Aven, 2011; Lin et al., 2015). In this case, parts are 
replaced, lubricants are changed, or adjustments are made before failure occurs. On the other 
hand, corrective maintenance is performed after failure has occurred in order to return the 
system to service as quickly as possible. Both PM and CM have distinctive judgement criteria. 
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In PM, procedures is judged with regards to increasing reliability of the system, whilst the 
criterion for judging CM is mostly the systems level of availability discussed above, which is 
the probability that the system will be operational when needed. In both PM and CM reducing 
the huge amount of time and cost spent is usually a factor of concern. This is one of the reasons 
that the Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) concept has been adopted for more than two 
decades now to provide an alternative maintenance framework and expertise to address the 
time and cost gaps (Deshpande & Modak, 2002).  
2.7.1 Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) 
RCM was developed in the early 1960’s by Nowlan and Heap as a well-structured, logical 
process for determining the optimum tactics for maintaining a certain piece of equipment, and 
to optimise maintenance procedures in the airline industry (Nowlan and Heap, 1978). The logic 
was subsequently adopted in the early 1980’s to develop several aspects of space shuttle’s 
maintenance. The logical process of RCM proved to be an efficient and effective approach for 
maintenance programs of all types. As part of RCM goals are to optimise maintenance and 
achieve the desired equipment reliability level at minimum cost, the practice also examined 
different possible ways that can lead to system failure and the appropriate maintenance tactics 
to manage failure (Bonnie & Donald, 2001). Particularly with the use of RCM’s decision logic, 
the system analyst will endeavour to determine the best maintenance strategy for a specific 
failure mode. Simplicity is one of the strengths of RCM. It is usually not analytically difficult 
and rigorous if compared with other types of reliability analysis and can be accessible to both 
technicians and maintenance engineers.  Decision making might however be very difficult 
considering questions without a certain answer (Eisinger & Rakowsky, 2001). In this case, 
safety is one of the troubling question gaps in traditional RCM application. An early question 
in the traditional decision logic concerns safety. Exemplifying this might be to verify if the 
system failure could have a direct, adverse effect on safety. Ideally such a simple question 
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deserves a yes or no answer, but in practice, gaps exist between the “yes” and “no” extremes. 
For every RCM analyst, the chances and choices of responding to the question differently for 
the same situation is not restricted, since no standard is offered by which to quantify the safety 
risk. The safety question can lead to significant error. Therefore, the essence of the question is 
to avoid unnecessary analysis in conditions where no safety risk exists.  Furthermore, the 
choice of optimum maintenance strategy is normally performed with a decision diagram. For 
this reason, many different decision diagrams are proposed for use in RCM analysis. Amongst 
the decision diagrams is the one illustrated in Figure 2-4 as proposed by (Eisinger & Rakowsky, 
2001). 
 
Figure 2-4 RCM Decision Diagram (Eisinger & Rakowsky, 2001) 
 
From Figure 2-4, there are four main segments in the decision diagram namely; the Criticality, 
First line maintenance, Detectability and Maintenance Strategy Segments. Under the Criticality 
segment, the “significant consequences” are intended to account if the component breakdown 
implies reduction on system function. While “other reasons for preventive maintenance” tends 
to devise means for other possible maintenance strategies, hence in some cases preventive 
maintenance is more expensive than corrective maintenance, the second segment “First line 
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maintenance” is concerned to know if the operator is able to carry out online supervision and 
maintenance. Subsequently, the “First line maintenance alone” objective is to know if the first 
line maintenance is sufficient and effective. The third Segment “Detectability” is saddled with 
the physics of failure. Also, with the presence of “Condition-based maintenance effective” to 
ascertain if there exists a method for effective condition monitoring, in order to avoid 
component failure. The maintenance strategy finds the best maintenance strategy to be carried 
out. According to (Zhu et al., 2015 and Berdinyazov et al., 2009), maintenance of a system 
normally involves maintenance of multiple components with multiple failure modes, and each 
of which may require a different policy. This is because a maintenance policy maybe best and 
appropriate for one component and worst for another. In virtually all industries, maintenance 
policy is an inevitable reality, especially the two major types of maintenance: Preventive 
maintenance and corrective maintenance present in RCM. Their policies are quite distinctive 
and worthy of exploring.  
2.7.2 Preventive Maintenance Policies 
Preventive maintenance (PM) policy is a policy that improves system safety and reduces 
system failure rate. Usually the PM is triggered when the system reliability and availability 
falls below certain defined threshold, thereby making it an optimisation problem as to optimise 
weak parameters and minimise cost. The policy occurs when the system is still in operation 
with the aim of sustaining the system specific components in a certain condition (Liu et al., 
2014).  More recently, the policy has advanced from focusing on a single –component 
degrading system to a multi-component system due to increasing system complexity. PM is 
not only relevant in maintenance overview architecture as shown in Figure 2-5, it in addition 
has two leading classes in its policies to determine which component to maintain, and 
determine to what degree the component be maintained.  
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Figure 2-5 Overview of CM and PM Maintenance (Niu et al., 2010) 
 
2.7.3 Significance of Preventive Maintenance Practice 
Preventive maintenance is divided into two segments: Predetermined maintenance and 
condition based maintenance (CBM) as depicted in Figure 2-5. Niu et al., (2010) explained that 
a predetermined maintenance is a scheduled maintenance without the occurrence of any 
monitoring activities. For CBM, it monitors components and the entire system condition in 
order to ascertain a dynamic preventive schedule. With regards to maintenance scheduling, it 
may be based on the following: 
 number of hours in use, 
 number of times a component has been used, 
 number of kilometres the components have covered and 
 according to prescribed dates etc. 
Preventive maintenance is usually very significant and has a very high preference over other 
types of maintenance. This can be due to the fact that it keeps safety checks alive and improves 
reliability and availability of a system through its policy and practice. It has two fundamental 
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policies: Either to implement PM after completing system assemblage or at each set-up time 
of the system component (Liu et al., 2015). A carefully articulated PM policy and practice 
restores system components to as new as originally designed or somewhere close to as new. 
This development is however dependent on the following conditions: 
 The extent of damage to, or wear and tear of the component 
 The type and quality of technological tool used to effect the maintenance, and 
 The level of technical knowledge or expertise gathered by the drafted maintenance 
personnel. 
A well implemented PM saves cost (Mahmood & Maxim, 2014), while a poorly implemented 
PM increases cost (Phuc et al., 2015). Figure 2-6 provides a list of important benefits of 
performing PM. 
 
Figure 2-6– Benefits of performing preventive maintenance on a system (Dhillon, 2006) 
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2.7.4 Corrective Maintenance Policies 
Corrective maintenance policy is a pure reactionary policy, where maintenance is carried out 
only when a system fails. In addition, the policy normally requires operating in an emergency 
mode with the aim of getting the equipment back in service as quickly as possible and in 
virtually new condition (Michael et al., 2000). CM is also referred to as repair (Liu and Huang, 
2015). A repair activity can be carried out immediately or deferred, but it is usually targeted at 
making the malfunctioned or failed system to recover and be in “available state”. These 
activities include a number of steps. Gao et al., (2012) showed that the steps include failure 
detection, isolation, decomposition, replacement, reassembling, testing etc. CM can be 
measured by “Mean Corrective Time” as defined by (Dhillon, 2006): 
   𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑇 =
∑ 𝜆𝑖  𝐶𝑀𝑇𝑖
∑ 𝜆𝑖
                                             (2.15) 
Where CMMT is the mean corrective time , 𝜆𝑖 is the failure rate of the  𝑖
𝑡ℎ system component, 
and 𝐶𝑀𝑇𝑖  is the corrective maintenance time of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ  system component. CM policy is 
greatly flexible such that its effectiveness can be improved by adopting appropriate strategy. 
To improve CM effectiveness is by reducing its time, and this can be achieved through the 
following strategies (Dhillon, 2002 & Blachard et al., 1995): 
 Reduce accessibility time: a significant amount of time is usually spent accessing failed 
components. It is therefore imperative to recognise that careful attention to accessibility 
whilst design is underway can help to lower the accessibility time of components, and 
consequently, the CM time. 
 Improvement of interchangeability: Effective functional and physical 
interchangeability is a fundamental factor during component replacement practice, thus 
it lowers CM time. 
30 
 
 Improvement of fault recognition, location and isolation: Experiences have shown that 
within a CM activity, Fault recognition, location and isolation consume the most time. 
Thus, good maintenance procedures, well-trained maintenance personnel, well-trained 
fault indicators and unambiguous fault isolation capacity are among the factors that 
help in reducing CM time. 
 Consideration of human factors: During design, paying careful and detailed attention 
to human factors such as instructions, selection and placement of indicators; size, shape 
and component weight helps to lower CM time significantly. 
 Employment of redundancy: This is mainly concerned with designing a redundant 
component with the capacity to switch in during the repair of faulty components such 
that the system continues to operate. 
It is also to be added that other different maintenance policies in the literature are summarised 
in below Table 2.1.  
Table 2.1- Summary of Maintenance Policies 
MAINTENANCE 
POLICIES 
DEFINITION SOURCE 
Predictive 
Maintenance 
Is a policy adopted to save cost and replace 
system critical components before failure 
occurs, hence many system failures are quite 
dangerous  
Giuseppe et al., 
2010 
Proactive 
Maintenance 
It is a maintenance policy that prevents 
failure from occurring.  It can detect, reduce 
or control the problems before complete 
failure occurs. 
Zhong-Hua et al., 
2013 
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Reactive 
Maintenance  
Reactive Maintenance is also largely 
referred to as breakdown, repair, or fix-
when-fail. It is a maintenance policy that 
assumes that failure is equally likely to 
occur in any system part or component, and 
that failure is age-related. Its policy 
precludes the identification of a specific 
group of repair parts as being more desirable 
than others. If the item fails and repair parts 
are not available, delays follow. If certain 
parts are needed to restore a critical machine 
or system to operation, a premium for 
expedited delivery must be paid. A complete 
reactive maintenance program ignores the 
many opportunities to influence equipment 
survivability.  
NASA Facilities 
RCM Guide, 2008. 
pp 5-3. 
2.7.5 Maintainability in Reliability  
Maintainability constitutes design parameters that help in cost and time reduction (Atalag et 
al., 2014 & Barabadi et al., 2011). It has four problematic (not been defined operationally 
viable) sub characteristics: analysability, changeability, stability and testability (Alf & Erik, 
2009). These aforementioned sub characteristics however complement its efforts and qualities. 
Analysability entails having comprehensive understanding of system behaviour prior to 
making necessary changes. Changeability (i.e., a two –dimensional characteristics: relating to 
efforts expanded during changes implementation and the resulting quality of changes) is one 
of the avoidable critical maintainability features (Rippel et al., 2014). Changes are continuously 
introduced to match with new system requirements (Sun et al., 2014). Testability verifies and 
facilitates the establishment of test criteria (Sohn & Poong, 2006), and determines whether the 
criteria have been met through performance (Guanjun et al., 2014). Additionally, 
maintainability boosts system performance especially that of complex and dynamic systems.  
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From a literature review point of view, maintainability can often be overstretched to suit 
management preference. Since maintainability reduces the amount of maintenance time, 
management in a bid to overstretching maintainability tends to stress on maintenance (prevent 
or correct failure events) standard. That is by imposing certain additional maintenance 
requirements that are most times unnecessary in order to constraint maintainability and subject 
its achievements to depend entirely on management decision. The key maintainability figures 
of merit are the 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 (H. Garg, 2014), and a limit for the maximum repair time. While 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 
includes access time, diagnosis time, spare parts supply, replacement time, checkout time and 
alignment time (Tsarouhas et al., 2009), the limit of a maximum repair time can be quantified. 
To quantify the repair time, let  𝑇 be regarded as the continuous random variable signifying the 
time to repair a failed unit, with a probability density function of ℎ(𝑡), then the cumulative 
distribution function 𝑀(𝑡) is computed below ( Ebeling, 2001). 
                            𝑃(𝑇 < 𝑡) = 𝑀(𝑡) = ∫ ℎ(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
𝑡
0
                                                            (2.16) 
Equation (2.16) is a probability Equation certifying that a repair on the failed unit (𝑢) will be 
accomplished within time 𝑡.  
For Weilbull distribution, system maintainability is computed as; 
 𝑀(𝑡) = Pr(𝑇 < 𝑡) = 1 − exp
−(
𝑡−𝛾
ƞ )
𝛽
                                                                                (2.17)      
where ( 𝛾, 𝛽, ƞ ), are parameters that allow the computation of reliability. 
 𝛾 – is a location parameter 
 𝛽 – is a shape parameter for describing the rate of change of failure rate 
  Ƞ - is scale parameter 
For normal distribution, system maintainability is computed as; 
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𝑀(𝑡) = Pr(𝑇 < 𝑡) = Ф (
𝑣 − 𝑡
𝜎
)                                                                                    (2.18) 
 where: 
  Ф Is the distribution function of a standard normal distribution. 
  𝑣 is the repair parameter of a normal distribution 
  𝑡 is the operating time. 
  𝜎 is the standard deviation of the failure and repair rate of normal distribution. 
For other distributions, the repair rate 𝜆𝑟 function is given as; 
 𝜆𝑟(𝑡) =
ℎ(𝑡)
𝜎
                                                                                                                 (2.19) 
2.7.6 Repairs  
Systems can either be repairable or non-repairable depending on the basic assumption on repair 
efficiency. Possible assumptions are minimal repair (As bad as old) and perfect repair (As good 
as new). In the minimal repair case, each repair leaves the system in the same state as it was 
prior to failure. Whilst the perfect repair case tries to fix the system and return it in a perfect 
and potential state that seems as if it was new. However, the reality between these peculiar 
cases is that: standard maintenance reduces failure intensity but will not leave the system as 
good as new (Doyen & Gaudoin, 2004). It is able to place the system state in a taxonomy that 
is better than minimal. 
For major repairable systems, repair practice is carried out at the system failed state, or 
alternatively prior to failed state. In both cases, the system can either be repaired on-site or off-
site. On-site repairs are less complex failure cases that can be corrected without keeping the 
system out of operation. Off-site repairs are complex (severe) failure cases that subject the 
system to be out of operation and taken to repair shop. Considering both cases, the steps 
required to be taken are not different, hence: the system is disassembled, evaluated and finally 
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repair is carried out to restore the system into a state in which it can perform its function again. 
An evaluation process determines the exact subsystem that has failed and needs to be fixed (i.e., 
if no redundancy) and also which non-failed subsystems shall be addressed under such 
circumstances. Besides these cases stated, many repairable systems consisting of one or more 
components and one repairman are deteriorative in nature due to accumulation of aging and 
damaging effects. Thus, ageing effects can be mitigated through performance of periodic 
preventive maintenance action to secure components rejuvenation. Such that some components 
are replaced in accordance with the hypothesis that ageing is a reasonable property of effective 
repair times. Moreover, effective repair activities increase the total system costs because it 
demands to have a sufficient number of repair technical team members on site at all times in 
readiness to intervene promptly when the need for the service arises.  
 This is normally followed by an increase in cost which is a preferable option, rather than 
reducing the number of technical repair team members on site or resorting to engage an external 
team which may lead to large production losses due to system downtime.  
A well implemented repair on any system only restores the system working condition, but does 
not change the system age. For this purpose, system working condition paves way for two 
possible replacement policies. One of the policies is based on the system working age that is 
largely dependent on the system environment, and operational working conditions which affect 
component ageing process. The other is based on the number of system failures (Leung et al., 
2011). According to (Zhang & Wang, 2009), implementation of these policies makes it feasible 
to observe that the more subsystems are replaced, the closer the system gets to its “new” (i.e., 
the original new state prior to use) state. Considering operational conditions, these conditions 
objectify the operational components modes (i.e., whether they are working continuously or 
not). The operational working conditions are as well related to the stress to which the 
component is submitted. Thus, in a more generic context, component operational conditions 
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could be expressed as a function of the number and duration of demands to operate for the ease 
of standby components, or through the operation time for components working continuously 
(Sebastian et al., 1999). While the environmental conditions objectify the environmental 
parameters under which the component is working, such as temperature and humidity. In safety 
related systems, some components work under different operational conditions. Over time, 
such components are placed in a very hard environment. For example, most times they are 
functioning under high temperature, while others remain in a very convenient environment. 
These factors usually have obvious negative effects on system inherent reliability; therefore, it 
becomes imperative that a system alongside with its components undergo repair to remain safe 
and reliable during operations.  
Systems can attain reliability through redundancy allocation and through design diversity. 
Since redundancy allocation technique is a multi-objective problem, comprehensive discussion 
on the subject is given in the third chapter of this work. Design diversity is a crucial technique 
where component failure can be coped with (Zheng Wang et al., 2015). The technique also 
mitigates common-mode faults and can successfully be implemented in several different ways, 
which includes (Cristiano et al., 2015): 
 Time or temporal diversity (i.e., repetition of the computation with different clock rates) 
 Different hardware copies (hardware diversity) 
 Employment of different design teams and design tools for the development of each 
system copy, particularly in a manner that commonalities are systematically avoided 
 It can also be by using a different backup architecture approach (Ryouhei et al., 2010).     
2.8 Techniques for Reliability and Safety System Analysis 
To analyse a safety system is usually characterised with difficulty (Koo, 2005). This is mainly 
due to the complexity associated with such a system. They are modern and complex in nature 
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and may not fit in a conventional system analysis framework (Filippini & Andres, 2014). The 
complexity further subjects the engineers to consider all possible hazards so as to guarantee 
operational success. However, safety systems can either be analysed qualitatively or 
quantitatively depending on the perceptions of the system engineer. The qualitative safety 
analysis method comprises of a diagrammatic description of the factors that might cause 
accidents, while the quantitative safety analysis method simply estimates the probability of 
occurrence of each cause, which in turn can be used in estimating the risk of the accident 
(Netjasov and Janic, 2008). This can be represented pictorially. As shown in Figure 2-7, 
Pictorial representation of safety system analysis techniques drawn from Rouvroye & Van den 
Bliek (2002), clearly delineates which analytical approach falls within qualitative and 
quantitative. According to the author, it is appropriate to understand that quantitative analysis 
is mainly applicable where there is inadequate or no data on the system component.  
 
Figure 2-7-Techniques of safety system analysis (Rouvroye  & Van den Bliek, 2002) 
The procedure for each of the analysis method is defined in Hanea et al., (2010); Yiannis et al., 
(2015); Rouvroye & Van den Bliek, (2002) including Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Reliability 
Block (RBD) and Double Failure Matrix (DFM). The FTA techniques analyses the failure mode 
of a system with special consideration on the possible events leading to such a failure mode.  
2.8.1 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
William et al., (2002) concurred that FTA is simply an analytical technique where an undesired 
state of the system is specified (usually a state that is from a safety and reliability standpoint). 
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It is a deductive reasoning method because it identifies failures prior to their occurrence, 
analyses accidents, and acts as an investigatory tools to pinpoint failures. In contrast to 
deductive reasoning, FTA becomes an inductive reason method because it commences with 
general top event or output event and develops down through the branches to a specific input 
event that must occur so as to generate the output (Akgun et al., 2015).  The faults in a system 
can be the events associated with mechanical failures, human errors, or any other related events 
with the tendency of leading to an undesired event. In clear terms, the sequence of events 
leading to probable occurrence of the undesired events is systematically divided into basic 
events whose failure probabilities can be estimated through logical interrelationships 
(Taheriyoun & Morandinejad, 2015). Quantitative and qualitative methods are apparent in FTA 
to ensure comprehensive reliability analysis of a system. The qualitative method deals with 
events and general factors affecting the system errors and excludes from consideration all 
numeric values, whilst the quantitative method is based on Boolean algebra where events either 
occur or not. However, the juxtaposition between these methods revealed that qualitative 
review is inherently required in the quantitative analysis. In other words, if failure data is 
assigned to the events, FTA measures safety through a risk based calculation or probability of 
failure distribution. If contrary (i.e., if no probabilities of failure data is assigned), FTA then 
falls under qualitative safety analysis. In practice, some of these techniques especially FTA and 
FMEA are generally static, and do not take into consideration the changes in system states, 
therefore are unable to capture dynamic system behaviour accurately (Yiannis et al., 2015). 
FTA is constructed by using several symbols to represent various events and describes 
relationships. Amongst these symbols are: AND gate, OR gate, COMBINATION gate, 
EXCLUSIVE OR gate, TRANSFER gate, and PRIORITY AND. During construction, the 
concept does not consider all possible system failures or all possible causes responsible for 
failure of a system. Rather the concept is tailored to top event that corresponds to some 
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particular system failure mode, considering only those faults that contribute to this top event, 
and realistic by the analyst (Lavasani et al., 2015 and Boudali et al., 2007). Therefore, the 
logical output of the gates occurs or in other words, is applicable under the following fault 
scenarios: AND gate Output occurs if all of the input faults occur. OR gate output fault occurs 
if at least one of the input faults occurs. COMBINATION gate output fault occurs if 𝑛 out of 𝑚 
of the input faults occur. EXLUSIVE OR gate output fault occurs if only one of the input faults 
occurs. TRANSFER gate transfers to/from another part of the fault tree, and PRIORITY AND 
gate output fault occurs if all of the input faults occur in a specific sequence. FTA construction 
steps are therefore provided as follows (CCPS, 2000): 
 Recognise the system and the way it operates in order to clarify communications and 
interactions between system components. 
 Identify top event as a unique event that represents a crisis state of the system capable 
of causing system failure. 
 Construct fault tree diagram and reasonable development of failure (i.e., to logically 
connect causes of top event to each other using the various gates e.g. “AND” and “OR” 
gates). 
 Qualitatively Analyse (i.e., to include ranking of basic events by determining their 
probabilities using data available and experts’ ideas) 
 Quantitatively analyse. In this case, to calculate the probability of top event. 
Chen et al., (2014), and Piterka et al., (2014) separately employed FTA method in their 
individual works. Chen et al., (2014) employed the method to synthesize various damage 
modes of a composite airframe that suffers from complex damage during operations and 
figured out a variety of options addressing the causes. Piterka et al., (2014) used the method to 
analyse two systems: an emergency core cooling system and a containment spray system for a 
nuclear power plant with a WWER 440/V213 reactor. Figure 2-8 depicts basic gates symbols 
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used in FTA, while a typical example of a constructed fault tree is showed in (Zhang et al., 
2014). FTA is quite informative, and can as well be endless in finding causes, especially causes 
that the determination of failure probabilities involving  human errors. 
 
 Symbol Name 
 
Description 
 
 
AND Gate 
The output event occurs only when all the input 
events exist simultaneously. 
 
INTERMEDIATE 
Event 
A fault event that results from interactions of 
other fault events that are developed through 
logic gates such as those defined above. 
 
 
Basic Event 
A component failure that requires no further 
development. A basic event is the lowest level 
of resolution in a fault tree. 
 
EXTERNAL 
Or 
HOUSE Event 
A condition or an event that is assumed to exist 
as a boundary condition for the fault tree. 
 
TRANSFER 
Symbols 
The TRANSFER sysmbol indicates that the 
faultree is developed further on another page. 
The symbols are labeled using numbers or a 
code to ensure that they can be differentiated. 
Transfer symbole are often used to avoid 
repeating identical logic in several places in a 
fault tree model 
 
OR Gate The output event occurs if any of the input 
events occur.  
Figure 2-8 Description of boolean logic functions (Hyo et al., 2005) 
2.8.2 Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) 
RBD is a basic reliability analysis tool. It analyses systems, especially complex systems, in a 
manner that requires the complexity be broken down into the simplest form. However, the 
analysis is not capable of capturing repair or test activities (Verlinden et al., 2012). RBD of a 
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system actually represents the effect of component failures on system performance, and each 
component is represented by a black box that is assumed to be in one of two states: operating 
or failed (Forche, 1990). Most researchers in this context believe that the use of RBDs is one 
of the most essential steps for system reliability (Bistouni & Jahanshahi, 2014; Bourouni, 2013 
& Levitin, 2007). For example, Yanjun & Wei, (2011) used the RBD approach to analyse 
system architecture and predict system reliability. Ding et al., (2014) proposed a novel method 
for safety integrity level (SIL) verification which plays a very critical role in reliability 
assessment of safety related systems, using RBD. Preference is made for the use of RBD in 
this work over others due to its ability to represent some of the redundancy strategies as shown 
in the Figures below.   
                                                 
Figure 2-9 RBD of a simple active                                                      
parallel redundancy                                               Figure 2-10 RBD of  standby redundancy  
                                   
 
Figure 2-11 RBD of voting redundancy 
Figure 2-9- fails only when both components (C1 & C2) have failed. Figure 2-10 also fails 
when all components have failed, while Figure: 2-11 fails when n out of m components have 
failed (in this case, 2 out of 3). 
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     Figure 2-12 RBD of a data processing and transmission system ( Levitin, 2007) 
Figure 2-12 consists of four consecutive subsystems. Levitin, (2007) explained that the 
distributions of performances of components composing each subsystem are as follows; 
components 3 𝑎𝑛𝑑 4, 6 𝑎𝑛𝑑 7, 8 𝑎𝑛𝑑 9 share the task and at the same time, compose two-
component blocks. The rest of the components in each subsystem perform the same tasks in 
parallel with the two-component blocks (providing the task execution redundancy). The Figure 
used RBD approach to illustrate the importance of redundant component on any system as such 
component shares task to make a system reliable.                            
2.8.3 Double Failure Matrix (DFM) 
DFM is an inductive technique that considers the effect of double failures. To explore its 
usefulness means the application will have to be limited to only noncomplex systems. DFM 
has various ways in which faults maybe categorised, this includes;  
 Negligible faults, 
 Marginal faults, 
 Critical faults and  
 Catastrophic faults (Roberts, 1987). 
A major setback in the safety analysis approach is that the approach usually finds it difficult to 
analyse a system from its early design stage to completion due to the increasing scale and 
complexity surrounding the analysis approach. To address this setback, engineers and safety 
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experts now uses HiP-HOPS and STAMP techniques. Hierarchical Performed Hazard Origin 
and Propagation Studies (HiP-HOPS) and System- Theoretical Accident Models and Process 
(STAMP) are regarded as new classical safety system analysis techniques proposed to close the 
gap in safety system analysis, and are discussed below.  
2.8.4 Stamp Based Analysis Techniques 
Under STAMP-Based analysis techniques, each hazard analysis technique is based on a model 
of accident causation. The cause of an accident (i.e., an unplanned and undesired loss event 
involving human death, injury and other major losses including equipment etc.), is viewed as 
the result of a lack of constraints imposed on the systems design and operations (leveson, 2004). 
This satisfies the basic concept of the STAMP model that the most basic concept is not an event 
but constraints.  That is the cause of accident, rather than being understood in connection to a 
series of events, is perceived as the result of a lack of enforcement of constraints imposed on 
the systems design and operation. Accidents only occur when system safety constraints are not 
enforced (Underwood & Patrick, 2014). Ouyang et al., (2010) proposed that the STAMP model 
of accident cause can be used to perform STAMP-Based Process Analysis (STPA). In other 
words, STPA is a safety analysis technique that is carefully handled based on the STAMP 
model of accident causation.  
Additionally, the STAMP analysis technique views system failure in a manner that is contrary 
to traditional techniques. This can be mainly due to the criticism that traditional techniques 
depend largely on failure events. Traditional techniques do not also perform well in handling 
system accidents in the presence of dysfunctional interactions among operating components 
rather than failure of individual components (Changyong, 2014). The STAMP model is built 
on three basic concepts: Safety constraints, a hierarchical safety control and process models – 
along with basic systems theory concepts. These concepts attracted STAMP technique a widely 
distinguished recognition in the analysis of system safety. In STAMP analysis, system safety is 
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regarded as a control problem considering that enforcement of constraints are done by control 
loops between the various levels of the hierarchical control structure that are in place during 
system design and operations (Changyon, 2014). Based on basic loop process, a system 
accident is likely to occur due to dysfunction resulting not only from system component failure, 
but also due to incorrect control rules. The challenge in adopting this method is therefore, to 
ensure prompt and adequate identification of safety -related constraints, and impose them on 
the system at various levels. Levels in this case are both design and operational levels. In fact, 
STAMP appreciates dynamism in systems as it tolerates faults in case of any change due to the 
breach of a constraint, the system still operates safely. However, the goal of STAMP analysis 
is built on the three earlier mentioned basic concepts, while the new STAMP based system 
analysis techniques (STPA) goals identify accident scenarios that encompass the entire 
accidents process, including design errors, software flaws, complex human decision-making 
errors, and other factors contributing to accidents (Leveson, 2011).  
STAMP-Based Process Analysis (STPA) technique is usually adopted at the systems early life 
cycle stage, and continues through the life of the system. During system design, it supports the 
realisation of a safety-driven process and helps shape early design decisions. At the early stage 
of system design, there is usually the possibility of a having shortage of useful information 
available to complicate design objectives and increase the challenges faced by the designer. In 
this case, adequate application of SPTA in hazard analysis becomes very handy in addressing 
information shortage issue leading to the challenges faced by the design engineer.  The SPTA 
techniques achieves the analysis of hazard where design information is in short supply by first 
carrying out initial analysis that encourages flexibility and that can accommodate further 
emerging information while the design is underway. According to (Leveson & Dulac, 2005), 
“at such early design stage where information is little, the analysis of hazards using STPA will 
be very general at first and then will later be refined and augmented as additional information 
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emerges from the design activities”. In accordance with the usefulness of this technique, several 
authors including Hata et al., (2015) have accomplished quality system designs that are safe 
(accident free) and reliable.  
2.8.5 HiP – HOPS Techniques 
The Hierarchical Performed Hazard Origin and Propagation Studies (HiP – HOPS) technique 
addresses the increasing complexity in design of modern engineering systems very effectively. 
The technique was aptly developed by Papdopoulos and McDermid in the late 1990s as a state-
of –the-art compositional system dependability analysis tool capable of closing the design 
complexity gaps highlighted above. The central capability of this tool is the automatic synthesis 
of Fault Trees and Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEAs) by interpreting reusable 
specifications of component failure in the context of a system model (Yiannis et al., 2011). In 
Particular, because the analysis is largely automated, requiring only the initial component 
failure data to be provided; it therefore reduces the manual effort required to examine system 
safety. Hip-HOPS functions in conjunction with commonly-used system modelling tools, such 
as Matlab Simulink or Simulation X, (Sharvia & Yiannis, 2015). More recently, the concept 
has been extended to solve a design optimisation problem relating to reliability and cost 
through components selection and replication and alternative subsystem architectures (Yiannis 
et al., 2011). Hip –HOPS uses genetic algorithm (GA) to evolve initial non-optimal designs 
into new designs that better achieve reliability requirements quickly with minimal cost. That 
is, by selecting different component implementations with different reliability cost 
characteristics. Alternatively, it substitutes alternative subsystem architectures with more 
robust patterns of failure behaviour which is what one of the Hip-HOPS phases provides to 
explore many solutions from a large design space. In furtherance to GA’s role, it exploits the 
automated fault tree and FMEA synthesis and analysis algorithms of a tool to calculate the 
fitness of each design candidate. GA’s goal also identifies Pareto Optimal architectures for the 
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system which provides optimal trade-offs between reliability, cost and other parameters that 
may constitute the design objectives. 
Hip-HOPS has three main phases: Model annotation, Fault tree synthesis, and Fault tree and 
FMEA analysis phase. The Model annotation phase keenly provides information to HiP-HOPS 
on how a component fails. The synthesis phase is the Hip-HOPS penultimate phase. What 
happens in this phase is the production of an interconnected network of fault trees that shows 
how component failures propagate from one component to another. In light of this, it relates 
how the component failure may progressively result to wider system failure. In the analysis 
phase which is perhaps the Hip –HOPS final phase, it analyses and examines the synthesized 
fault trees through automated algorithms to generate minimal cut sets of the system. Generated 
minimal cut sets not only describe necessary and sufficient combination of events that leads to 
undesired event, but also investigate the different scenarios to find for instance the redundant 
components that could be added to improve reliability (Mohamed-Larbi & Daoud, 2013). 
Quantitative analysis of the generated minimal cut sets data can then be used to evaluate the 
system reliability and unavailability values. In this case, the approach allows data combination 
into a multiple failure mode FMEA in order to show both direct and indirect effects of failure 
modes on the system. In general, Hip-HOPS encourages reusability by enabling failure-
annotated components to be stored conveniently. Based on this, other components which are 
similar in type are allowed to reuse the failure data and save the designer the time and energy 
of having to re-enter the same failure data multiple times. Apart from analysis of the safety 
system to determine the reliability state of systems, another important issue in systems which 
is as important as reliability, is system redundancy. To properly handle redundancy, the two 
leading redundancy allocation strategies must be respected in practice. According to Kong et 
al., (2015), these strategies are active and standby and are further classified as hardware 
redundancy as shown in the Figure 2-13. 
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Figure 2-13 Redundancy strategies (Technical Manual 5-698-1, 2007) 
2.9 Active Redundancy Strategy 
Ardakan and Hamadani (2014) explored significantly the best period to engage in active 
redundancy strategy. In general, all redundant components units in active redundancy 
simultaneously start operation from time zero, even though only one component is required in 
a particular time. It does not require an external component to perform a detection function, 
decision and switching when a component or system path fails. They automatically pick up the 
load for a failed unit. A typical example of this system is multi engine aircraft, where the 
aircraft can continue to fly with one or more engines out of operation. The principal component 
forms a parallel system, and the redundant component undergoes the regular stress level as the 
principal component. Parts can be replaced, and system performance can as well be improved 
by introducing this kind of redundancy strategy (Misra & Misra, 2011). In this case, active 
redundancy may be suitably adopted to provide spares to the coherent system either as 
component redundancy or system redundancy. More excellent insights about active 
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redundancy including their application have been explored in Bueno & Carmo, (2007); Valdes 
& Zequeira, (2006).  
2.9.1 Standby Redundancy Strategy 
In the standby redundancy arrangement, the redundant components are used sequentially in the 
system at failure times. Apart from that, the strategy is further compartmentalised into three 
variants known as; cold, warm and hot (Nanda & Hazra, 2013), and is usually employed when 
system replacement takes a negligible amount of time without causing failure on the system. 
When a component is effectively carrying out the required function within a specific time 
without failure, that component is referred to as the active one. While the other component(s) 
that back-up, is the spare or standby.  The spare can switch to be active only when failure has 
occurred on the active component (Zhao & Liu, 2005). The failure idea of a standby 
redundancy is that the system fails when all the components have failed, and when a component 
failure is detected as soon as it occurs, it is usually possible to use standby redundancy. The 
three standby strategies (cold, warm and hot) depend on whether the system process of ending 
is tolerable or not (Soltani et al., 2013). For Cold standby, it implies that the redundant units, 
when not required are not in use and thus have zero failure rates. For warm-standby, it portends 
a possibility for the redundant components that failure rates of components are lower than hot-
standby redundancy, while hot-standby redundancy is so close to active redundancy and all 
components might fail (Yahyatabar & Jahromi, 2012). Excellent insights including a failure 
rate model of the aforementioned redundancy strategies are explored in Lewis, (1996) & 
Zoulfaghari et al., (2014).  
2.10 Methods of System Configurations 
Reliability of a system depends on a few fundamental principles. First, the quality of the design 
materials, the designer’s level of knowledge and the configuration (arrangement) methods 
adopted during the system assembly. Often a system can be literally found having many 
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components (i.e., a multi component system). In this situation, the system reliability becomes 
the function of the individual components reliability, and the adopted configuration method. A 
System configuration can take either of the two known fundamental ways: Series configuration 
or parallel (redundant) configuration. Each of these can be demonstrated by means of a 
reliability block diagram (RBD) as shown below. 
  
                                                  Component        
 
 
A multi-component system can also be represented with end points having a network of blocks. 
In such connection, the system is regarded as a working system if the end points connection 
between the source and the sink nodes exist (i.e. x and y), otherwise it is regarded as a system 
in a failed state if the endpoints connection does not exist. To show systems with 𝑀 ,  the same 
number of components in series and parallel configurations using a reliability block diagram 
(RBD) is demonstrated in Figures 2-15 and 2-16 respectively. 
 
 
                                                                                                               
 
Figure 2-15 is a typical simple series system configuration. The system is made up M, 
independent modules consisting of components 1 and 2. All the module with components must 
operate in order for the system to function properly. Components 1 and 2 can have a specific 
1 2 𝑀 
     Figure 2-15 Reliability block diagram for a system in series 
Figure 2-14 Simple reliability block diagram  
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range of component choices to make, and it absolutely depends on the total components  𝑀,  
available.  
A series system fails completely if either of the components (1 𝑜𝑟 2) fails, and this 
development makes it less reliable when compared to a  parallel system configuration. Should 
each component be represented by 𝐴𝑖 ,  such that 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑀, series system reliability can then 
be represented as a probability that all the components are in a working state. That is,  𝑅𝑠 = 
Probability (All components are working), and the mathematical expression is shown in 
Equation(2.20) . 
             𝑅𝑠 = 𝑃(𝐴1 ∩ 𝐴2 ∩, … , 𝐴𝑀)                                                                                                2.20                                                                            
          (𝑃𝐴𝑖) is the probability that component  𝐴𝑖  ,  is in a working condition.  
Reliability is very vital, especially in relevant industries where systems are expected to 
successfully carry out operations. Given this significance, it is therefore expedient to increase 
series system reliability through any best possible way or strategy. One of the ways that has 
been proposed in the literature by Ahmadizar & Soltanpanah, (2011), to increase system 
reliability is through the addition of components to each module in parallel. This strategy 
increases the system reliability and reduces system failure rate. With regards to Parallel system 
configuration, the system is said to be in a failed condition if all  𝑀,  components found in the 
system have failed. Applying the same  𝐴𝑖 , components notation to represent the parallel 
system configuration, reliability will therefore assume this order; 𝑅𝑠 =  Probability (All 
components are failed). Mathematically, 
          𝑅𝑠 = 𝑃(𝐴1 ∪ 𝐴2 ∪, … , 𝐴𝑀)                                                                               (2.21)       
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 Figure 2-16 is a simple parallel system configuration designed to function even under a failure 
scenario of either of its subsystem. The description of the subsystem/module is in similitude 
with that of series configuration. The system has a total components 𝑀, and two independent 
components 1 and 2  in each of the modules. Components 1  and 2  can have a specific range 
of component choices to make which absolutely depends on component availability. However, 
the significant difference here is that the subsystems are connected in parallel. A parallel system 
connection is one where the success of any one of the components in the system results in the 
system overall success. Failure of a single or more subsystem does not lead to system failure, 
instead the system only losses a portion of its productivity. This is because alternative parts 
will continue to provide operation. For this reason the parallel system configuration 
outperforms that of series and proves to be more reliable.  
Using these configuration principles, system configuration can extend to series-parallel and 
parallel-series through appropriate combination of both system structures. A typical Series-
parallel system structure is depicted overleaf in Figure 2-17. Such structure is usually a 
coherent system made up of series modules consisting of parallel components (Nahas et al., 
2007). On the other hand, a Parallel- Series system is a coherent system that can be describe as 
a parallel arrangement of disjointed series modules, see Figure 2-18.   
1 
2 
𝑀
> 𝑡) 
Figure 2-16 Reliability block diagram of a system in parallel 
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2.10.1  Series-Parallel System Configuration Method 
 
                   
Figure 2-17 Reliability block diagram of a Series- Parallel System (Bris et al., 2003)                              
Conceptually, series-parallel system configurations consist of subsystems connected in series, 
such that each subsystem can have several elements connected in parallel as shown in Figure 
2-17. The capacity and productivity of the system elements is fundamental, especially with 
respect to overall system performance evaluation. Components can fail and be repaired to make 
the system available, because availability targets to satisfy customers demand. Additionally, 
components contained in subsystems are characterised according to their availability, cost and 
performance (Ouzineb et al., 2008). From Figure 2-17, the entire system structure contains four 
series modules consisting of eleven parallel components overall. Each of the components is 
assumed to be in good working condition and is reliable.  
2.10.2  Parallel-Series System Configuration Method 
 
 
 
 
 
                
        Figure 2-18 Reliability block diagram of parallel -series (Liu,2003) 
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Under a Parallel- Series system configuration, modules are connected in parallel as shown in 
Figure 2-18. The system also has a very good reliability and performance level. In addition, a 
typical optimisation problem concerned on the best way to determine the optimal number of 
parallel components in each subsystem, is usually a reliability constraint. A reliability 
constraint imposes a minimum requirement of subsystems/system reliability.  
From reliability literature, there are, practically, many other types of system configurations, 
among them are  ′𝑘 − 𝑜𝑢𝑡 − 𝑜𝑓 𝑀 ′ and complex systems. A ′𝑘 − 𝑜𝑢𝑡 − 𝑜𝑓 𝑀 ′ system is 
similar to a parallel system, as long as at least 𝑘,  channels function, the system will function 
(Lu et al., 2008 & David Coit et al., 2015). For a complex system, it neither takes the shape of 
a series nor parallel system in the arrangement of its structural components. Rather, many 
numbers of component and links that aid interactions between the system and environment are 
usually present.   
2.10.3  Complex System Configuration Method 
A complex system is characterised by large numbers of components, cut sets or link sets, or by 
statistical dependence between the components states (Kiureghian & Song, 2008). These 
characteristics make it considerably difficult to understand and design. The first characteristic 
is that it interacts within the system and the environment in order to avert possible failure. The 
second is that correlations exist between the system components and its environment to restrain 
the system from getting more complex. In other words, it controls the dynamics of complex 
systems. In the case of designing a complex system, the parts can either be identical or non-
identical. To this end, it is appropriate to refer to Boland & El-Neweihi, (1995), whose work 
extensively addresses how to determine appropriate system configuration conditions that can 
tolerate identical or non-identical parts. Moreover, complex systems make it quite challenging 
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to realise the exact system objective during the design process and system prediction time. This 
complexity emanates as a result of such system behaviour which steadily increases in size, 
dependencies and interactions amongst subsystems (Huang et al., 2014). A typical example of 
a complex system is depicted in Figure 2-19, whilst additional useful insights concerning 
complex systems can be explored in (Constantinou et al., 2015).  
               
         Figure 2-19 Complex system structure (Constantinou et al., 2015). 
To ascertain reliability of a complex system can be actualised through several analytical 
methods such as Fault Tree Based method, Matrix Multiplication method, Decomposition 
method, Minimal Cut-Set methods and many more. A Comprehensive overview of these 
methods has been explored by the following authors: Volkanovski et al., (2009); Song & Won-
Hee, (2009); Yeh et al., (2015); Yevkin, (2009) and Rahman, (2011). However, for most 
complex systems with multi-level such as Mechanical, Hybrid Renewable energy etc., applying 
some of these methods can be difficult and time consuming. Based on this, several other 
methods have been further proposed by other researchers to cushion the gaps found in the 
literature. Amongst these methods is the bounding method for full-system reliabilities based 
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on sub-system tests, without requiring subsystem independence Stacy et al., (2013), and a 
simulation modelling method for complex system reliability proposed by Cao et al., (2012), as 
a more technical approach to realizing complex system reliability.     
Apart from that, another fascinating type of solution for actualising reliability of a complex 
system is the Monte-Carlo (MC) Simulation technique. Monte-Carlos is a noteworthy 
computational tool for simulation, the idea is to simulate a complex system (or part of it) and 
determine the system performance for easy decision making (Canale et al., 2014). The method 
has been widely adopted by many researchers in the recent years to address complex system 
reliability due to its appropriateness to complex systems. The only unfriendly side of the MC 
method is the computational efforts that may be involved (Naess et al., 2009). Thus, the 
computational time does not grow abruptly as in the case of analytical methods. With the latest 
advancement in computer technology, faster processing machines that are capable of 
optimising the runtime of the simulation algorithm are now accessible. Many publications in 
this area have been made, and they are generally detailed on the use of simulation methods 
using different approaches. Amongst these approaches is the Hull girder reliability assessment 
approach to provide accurate estimates for the failure probability with reduced computational 
cost.  In addition to that, Haifeng & Asgarpoor, (2011) proposed a sequential Monte Carlo 
simulation based method to generate reliability and maintainability history charts for which the 
reliability indices, as well as their probability distribution were successfully calculated.  System 
reliability is practically about reducing failure rate and possible estimation of time to failure, 
𝑇 , which is a continuous random variable. The uncertainty associated with  𝑇 can be described 
using an appropriate cumulative probability distribution function of system failures   𝐹(𝑡)  
which is characterised by the probability  𝑃(𝑇 ≤ 𝑡), as defined earlier in equation(2.3).   
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2.11 Probability Distributions for Modelling Time to Failure 
There are many probability distributions for modelling descriptive characteristics of the 
continuous random variable  𝑇 . However, it is quite important to determine the distribution 
that best describes the failure pattern because the choice of distribution can adversely affect a 
calculated reliability value of a system, with respect to some distributions associated with 
constant failure rate. The two main leading probability distributions are exponential 
distribution and weilbull distribution. The exponential distribution is mostly applicable to 
electronic components and complex systems, while the weilbull distribution is mostly 
applicable to Mechanical components. 
2.11.1 Exponential Distribution of Failure Pattern 
Exponential distribution is one of the very important types of distribution. It is often also 
referred to as negative distribution in reliability literature, and perhaps the most widely applied 
statistical distribution in reliability field. One of the reasons for its importance is that the 
exponential distribution has a constant failure rate function (Artur, 2013), while for other 
distributions, the rate at which failures occur varies with time. With regards to other 
distributions, failure rate cannot be discussed, instead the term Hazard Function (i.e., a function 
that describes how the rate of failures varies over time) is used (Wang et al., 2002). This type 
of distribution is used to model assumptions of a constant failure rate or hazard rate,  𝜆,   which 
is an instantaneous rate of failure ( 𝜆 > 0) . Implying that the probability that a system or 
component that has survived time  𝑡 , will fail within a limited interval of time,′𝑡, 𝑡 + 𝛥𝑡′  is 
constant. The failure probability  𝜆𝛥𝑡 , is independent of system age and with respect to 
modelling a system life, it can be shown to have the exponential distribution (negative) using 
the assumption of constant failure rate. The probability distribution is defined with respect to 
equation 2.2 which has a constant failure rate as: 
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          𝐹(𝑡) = 1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝−𝜆𝑡                                                                                                             (2.22) 
where: 
 𝐹(𝑡),  is the probability density function (PDF) over time 𝑡 . 
 𝑡,  is the length of time the system must function 
 𝑒𝑥𝑝, is the base of natural logarithms 
𝜆  is failure rate (inverse of MTBF) 
This Equation is applicable only when the rate at which failures occur is constant.  
Furthermore, the above relationship in Equation (2.22) can also be shown for the reliability 
function  𝑅(𝑡), generated in Equation(2.1), and the density function of the time to failure 
 𝑓(𝑡),  in Equation(2.5). 
For Reliability function 𝑅(𝑡), the expression becomes: 
 𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝−𝜆𝑡                                                                                                               (2.23) 
Where: 
 ′ 𝑅(𝑡) ’ is the reliability over time  𝑡. 
While for the density function of the time to failure 𝑓(𝑡) , the new expression is shown in the 
equation below. 
                        𝑓(𝑡) = 𝜆𝑒𝑥𝑝−𝜆𝑡                                                                                               (2.24) 
                           
Figure 2-20 Probability density function of negative exponential distribution (Todinov, 2005)                      
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Further mathematics involving special cases in this kind of distribution such as “The two-
parameter exponentiated exponential (EE) or generalized exponential (GE)” where failure rate 
function with other cases like mean residual lifetime and many more are carefully explored by 
David Han, 2015 and Nandini et al., (2010). 
2.11.2 Weilbull Distribution 
Weilbull distribution is mainly applicable to mechanical systems and can be used to manage 
moderately large amounts of data. It was introduced by Professor Waloddi Weilbull in the early 
1950’s and became so popular for modelling phenomenon with monotonic failure rates. It is 
widely used in reliability engineering and elsewhere due to its versatility and relative simplicity. 
It requires a large amount of experience to be able to use it in practice. Three parameters 
without physical meaning are fundamental in Weilbull distribution. These parameters 
are ( 𝛾, 𝛽, ƞ ), and they are parameters which allow the computation of reliability and MTBF. 
However, one unpopular feature of the Weilbull distribution is that it fails to provide a good fit 
to data sets with bathtub shaped failure rates that are often encountered in reliability literature 
(Singla et al., 2012). The cumulative Weilbull distribution is given as: 
                                                𝐹(𝑡) = 1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝
−(
𝑡−𝛾
ƞ )
𝛽
                                                      (2.25) 
where: 
  𝛽,  is the shape parameter, also known as the Weilbull slope. It clearly describes the 
rate of change  of failure rate, increasing or decreasing. 
  ƞ,  is the scale parameter   
 𝛾,  is the location parameter 
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To model a variety of life behaviours depends on the values of the shape  𝛽,  and scale  ƞ,    
parameters. These values affect the distribution characteristics, and a change in the parameters 
value can transform the distribution into an exponential or normal distribution. The value of 
the location parameter 𝛾 is usually zero (Smith, 2001). So when the value of 𝛽=1, and the value 
of ƞ= 1/ 𝜆, the Weilbull distribution takes the exponential distribution shape as depicted in 
Equation(2.22). Further transformation takes place when the value of 𝛽 > 3, in this case, the 
distribution is approximately normal. Now, using the reliability relationship initially 
established in Equation(2.1), to show that the above cumulative Weilbull distribution can also 
be shown for the system reliability or survival function 𝑅(𝑡). 
 𝑅(𝑡) = exp−(𝑡/ƞ)
𝛽
                                                                                                         (2.26) 
Extended mathematical models with relevant reliability concepts are detailed clearly in 
Todinov, (2005). 
 
2.11.3 Other Existing Distributions 
Apart from the two famous distributions aptly summarised above, due to their effectiveness in 
estimating industrial failure probability, there are other useful distributions that registered their 
presence in the literature. Amongst them are Lognormal, Uniform, Binomial and Poisson. First, 
the Binomial distribution, otherwise known as a discrete distribution (i.e., a distribution that 
allows a random variable to take only two values, say ‘0’ or ‘1’ with equal probability) provides 
statistical independence in reliability analysis, especially at component level. In fact, it defines 
the ideal state at which a system component will work. The binomial distribution approach 
entails that the probability that a component will be working is completely independent of the 
state (working or failed) of other components. Furthermore, the probability of success in each 
trial (the probability that the component will be working) is the same.  This is mathematically 
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demonstrated below, supposing that 𝑋,  is the number of failures in 𝑛 independent trials,  𝑅 is 
the probability of success at each individual trial, then 𝑋,  is a random variable with Binomial 
distribution: 
           𝑃(𝑋 = 𝑟) = (
𝑛
𝑟
) 𝑅𝑛−1(1 − 𝑅)𝑟 ,    0 < 𝑅 < 1, 𝑟 = 0,1, … , 𝑛             (2.27) 
According to Ming Han, (2012),  𝑅,  is also called the reliability of product at the censored 
time,  𝑡 . Generalised mathematical Binomial distribution models and their functions are 
carefully handled in Bergeron, (2013). 
The Poisson distribution is also discrete in nature, but quite different from the binomial 
distribution. Both distributions can be carefully adopted for the modelling of defects. While 
the binomial distribution models the number of defects or incidents in a fixed sample size with 
a fixed failure probability, the Poisson distribution models the occurrence of some phenomenon 
such as the amount of defects within a fixed region of space using lambda ( 𝜆 )  as its parameter. 
The probability distribution function of a Poisson distribution is given as; 
 𝑓(𝑥) =
𝜆 𝑥 exp {−𝜆 }
𝑥!
, 𝑥 = 0,1,2, … , 𝑛                                                                               (2.28) 
 where:  
  𝜆 is the number of occurrences 
  𝑥 is a random variable. 
These distributions usually have different graphic shapes, and typical examples of lognormal, 
normal, Poisson and binomial distributions are shown in Figure 2-21 overleaf.  
 
 
60 
 
 
Figure 2-21: Schematic of distributions function (Erik et al., 2012). 
Therefore, to know the exact distribution to use in data management can be found in Nikolaidis 
et al., (2005). The author summarised in Table 2.2 that to apply each distribution method 
largely depends on data size. 
Table 2.2 - Selection Process for All Classes of Distributions (Nikolaidis et al., 2005) 
Distribution Typical Uses for Distribution 
Normal  Large amount of data. 
 Large amount of experience. 
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Uniform  Small amount of data. 
 Good quantification of physical bounds. 
 Large amount of uncertainty of most likely values. 
Beta  Small amount of data. 
 Good quantification of physical bounds. 
 Good quantification of most likely values. 
Weibull  Moderate to large amounts of data. 
 Large amount of experience. 
Lognormal  Moderate to large amounts of data. 
 Large amount of experience. 
Poisson  Models total number of occurrences of some phenomenon 
during a fixed time period or within a fixed region of space. 
Binomial  Models number of defects or incidents in a fixed sample size 
with a fixed failure probability. 
Hyper distribution  Small amount of data. 
 Poor quantification of physical bounds. 
 Large amount of uncertainty of most likely values. 
2.12 Design for Reliability 
Design for reliability is crucial as it starts in the idea phase of the product development cycle 
and continues through the product obsolescence. It is employed to effect positive product 
reliability improvement by utilizing physics-of-failure knowledge to design out potential 
problems. Very often, it is related with two other blocks (Reliability verification and Analytical 
Physics) of activities to constitute a coherent design process.  With regards to reliability 
verification, it targets to satisfy customers’ reliability objectives, which are usually two fold: 
design maturity testing and process reliability. Given these developments, design maturity 
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testing demonstrates that customer’s needs will be met when the product is eventually exposed 
to demanding conditions, while process reliability provides a basic foundation for achievement 
of a realistic accelerated design maturity test. The second activity which is analytical physics, 
gathers knowledge about a system’s physics-of-failure; which is concerned with understanding 
how and why systems fail. In addition, during reliability design, different design stages are 
accounted for, starting with the conceptual stage and continuing through to the final system 
stage. These processes include the following: Idea, Evaluation, Development, Transition and 
Production stage to ensure product reliability, see Figure 2-22.  
            
Figure 2-22 Design for reliability process (Crowe, 2000)                       
Firstly, the idea phase applies concurrent engineering processes for reliability design. That is 
to have an exact understanding of the customers’ requirements, which often includes the tools 
of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Product competitive benchmarking, and 
reliability predictive modelling which is used to direct the design approach. Deployment of 
these tools is used to reduce associated design risks in order to record success when a product 
is eventually lunched into market as a prime target. To this end, the first real reliability impact 
occurs at this stage, and the idea phase is the first concept where a design solution is conceived 
to define the ultimate reliability level that can be guaranteed, see Figure 2-23.  
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Figure 2-23 Conceptual reliability design model (Injoong, 2010).              
From the above Figure, dash-dot lines show how a component reliability can be determined 
from a statistics-based model or a physics-based model. System reliability is then assessed 
from components to subsystem to parent system. When the reliability assessed is higher than 
or equal to the assigned target reliability, it implies no design modification is required or 
recommended. However, when the assessed reliability is less than the assigned reliability target, 
the design changes are recommended. 
In a situation where system designs are not possible nor available, design changes may be 
initiated at the parent system level, so that redundant/modularized/alternative subsystems or 
other approaches can be pursued. 
Secondly, the evaluation phase accounts for the design risk and its possible mitigation 
mechanism because design-risk mitigation activities occur at this phase. Evaluation goal, 
therefore, is to resolve possible uncertainties around the chosen design approach through 
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performing risk-mitigation studies to ascertain the level of feasible reliability growth and 
improvement. Under this activity, reliability growth worth 65 percent can be achieved from the 
initial design point before proceeding to the reliability development phase for proper design 
validation. This phase validates and demonstrates that the reliability design is capable of 
meeting its targets. In this case, the target is to know if the expected operating-life requirements 
identified from the design conceptual stage have been met, using Design Maturity Testing 
(DMT). DMT is normally based on physics of failure and afterwards, gives way for the 
transition phase to be effected on the design. 
Under the transition phase, the design is carefully screened to ensure robustness in early 
production units, as well as check for infant mortality problems. That is, to assist in defining 
the proper screening method capable of preventing infant mortality failures from occurring. 
This process is usually uneasy as adequate failure mechanisms must be found and employed to 
carefully detect flaws and retain a product’s useful life. Lastly, the production phase defines a 
proper reliability monitoring process and technique to control design performance and ensure 
it is in steady state over its life time. Reliability monitoring adequately prevents process 
variation of a product cycle from affecting product reliability.  
Whilst engineering design is important because it is reliability driven, in many cases the cost 
of the system is also a very important objective to consider. Cost and reliability are normally 
two conflicting objectives. Quite often, a design is driven by reliability as the main objective 
with other assessment criteria, including the cost, as the secondary objectives. The designer 
saves cost by designing for reliability and dealing with uncertainties. Uncertainties are known 
phenomenon that usually confront design engineers, their occurrence on a system can lead to 
huge financial loss. They also occur in loading, material properties, geometry and other aspects 
of functional systems. In most cases they are viewed in different taxonomy as reducible or 
irreducible uncertainties. Reducible uncertainties are caused by a lack of data, modelling 
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specifications, human errors, etc. while irreducible uncertainties happen at random, and no 
known measure has been found capable of reducing their occurrence. To this end, handling a 
great deal of uncertainties in modelling and evaluation allows designers to carefully consider 
one or more of the following: 
 Collecting more data 
  Understanding the problem better 
 More quality control, especially in terms of using more reliable components instead of 
using standard components, 
 Implementing redundancies in the system, 
 Incorporating diversity to avoid common mode failure,  
 Alternating the design concept, for example, towards reducing the number of 
components or to remove the critical components from the design, and 
 Adding fail-safe mechanisms to control the consequence of a failure.  
Additionally, designers introduce deterministic design approach by using safety factors to 
cover the effect of uncertainties on system performance. The only shortcoming with a 
deterministic design approach is its inability to predict reliability performance of a system 
ahead of time. According to Nikolaidis et al., (2005), designers must have a complete 
understanding of the system, subsystem and its components performance under nominal and 
off-nominal conditions. Such that when a deterministic design approach is applied to various 
scenarios, the consequences if any can be evaluated. Based on this, designers mainly consider 
one of the following: 
 Robust design, in which the functionality and performance is less sensitive to the 
variation of design parameters, and  
 Designers also adopt a non-deterministic design in which the uncertainties in modelling 
are quantified and taken into account in the early design stage.  
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However, application of deterministic and nondeterministic design approaches can assist in 
meeting the goals of a successful design only if the designer rightly understands the design 
sensitivities and validities.  Sensitivity refers to the likelihood that an effect will be detected, 
while validity refers to the likelihood that; what is detected is in fact, of interest. In other words, 
as regards to a deterministic design approach, the designer takes into account the existence of 
uncertainties and considers them in the design, through application of suitable safety factors. 
The assumption is that, careful introduction of safety factors into the design and considering 
worst- case scenario, leads to design of a reliable system. 
2.12.1 Deterministic Design  
Under deterministic design, key principles based on deterministic considerations have served 
as the backbone of typical real life systems designed for safety. Amongst these principles 
include; defense-in-depth, safety margin, redundancy, diversity, and independence. These 
principles are absolutely useful design concepts, and as a result, sustain their important roles 
in keeping the aforementioned kind of systems safe. This is because an ideal system designed 
for safety analysis, primarily focuses on events initiation rather than event consequences. 
Which means a step-by-step sequence of events from initiation to final stabilized conditions 
should be addressed for each initiating event. However, preponderant emphasis is still placed 
on initiating events, as no systematic method capable of identifying the associated event 
consequences is provided (Ahn et al., 2010). This also constitutes one of the deterministic 
design approaches weaknesses. Apart from that, a couple of performance deficiencies of typical 
real life systems are as inherent with this approach. Take for instance, Hybrid Renewable 
Energy Systems (HRES) where Maheri (2014), highlighted the following difficulties during a 
critical evaluation of a deterministic design approach of a standalone HRES: 
 Accurately predicting the cost of the system 
 Does not evaluate power reliability of the system directly, and 
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  Its solutions lead to unpredictable power reliability 
 In fact, no reliability measure is calculated as part of design candidate assessment. 
These weaknesses can be overcome through replacing the traditional deterministic approach 
for making the design and decisions with a balanced risk-based one that uses rigorous models 
to quantify uncertainties and assess safety. In short, this is the exclusive role of the non-
deterministic approach.  
2.12.2 Non-Deterministic Design 
Non-deterministic design approaches help in designing safer and cheaper systems than a 
traditional deterministic approach. As mentioned earlier, the approach accounts for 
uncertainties in the operating environment, the material properties and the accuracy of 
predictive models. Uncertainties may include the following; 
 Variability (natural uncertainty): Uncertainty due to inherent randomness or 
unpredictability of the physical system; irreducible and can only be quantified in a 
statistical sense. 
 Model parameter uncertainty (data uncertainty): Incomplete knowledge of model 
parameters/inputs due to insufficient or inaccurate data; reducible by sufficient data or 
accurate measurements.  
 Model structure uncertainty (model uncertainty): uncertain model formulation due to 
approximations and simplifications in a model; reducible by improving model 
formation (Agarwal, 2004). 
In general, engineering design problems mostly assume complex forms especially when they 
have more than one design objective (multi-objective). In this case design objectives become 
conflicting in terms of finding the best objective that will stand out as the best design solution 
against the other objectives. This scenario leaves system designers to figure out the best 
adoptable approach to arrive at the best solution without compromising other objectives. 
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Certainly, improvement in one objective leads to a worse solution for at least one other 
objective.  One of the realistic approaches is the use of multi-objective optimisation. Multi-
objective optimisation is a realistic way of solving many complex engineering problems. The 
approach can resolve conflicting design objectives through optimisation as detailed in chapter 
three of this work.  
 
2.13 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, the author revealed and analysed various parameters used to measure reliability 
and extensively discussed reliability concepts which clearly showed that the concept is a 
function of time. Reliability of a system decreases with time due to several factors such as 
component aging, failure and the use of substandard design materials. These factors remain a 
concern in the engineering field which needs to be addressed. To address these factors, the 
author has established that a good design approach capable of addressing the physics of failures 
at every design stage should be adopted. In the author’s view, there are various ways a system 
can fail, and often the cause of failure originates from system faults which subsequently result 
in system failure if not promptly detected and fixed.  
The chapter subsequently demonstrated that paying much attention on system maintenance and 
maintainability are fundamental for reliability improvement of systems. In addition, several 
maintenance practices capable of addressing both system components that can successfully 
undergo maintenance and the ones that cannot were explored. Furthermore, the condition and 
necessity leading to incorporation of design for system reliability were handled alongside with 
types of system configurations and modern analysis techniques by which a system can be 
effectively analysed. From the explored literature, it revealed that multi-objective optimisation 
approach is more a realistic solution approach amongst other approaches used in solving 
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complex engineering problems. Therefore, the following chapter will extensively explore 
various multi-objective optimisation methods and techniques of solving complex engineering 
problems. Afterwards, multi-objective approach will be adopted in chapter four to solve multi-
level formulation problem as one of the complex engineering problems addressed in this work.  
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3. Redundancy Allocation: A 
Multi-Objective Optimisation 
Problem 
 
As stated earlier, redundancy allocation problem (RAP) is one of the most widely applied 
techniques to increase system reliability, Safari, (2012); Pourdarvish & Zahra, (2013). It is 
effort driven, requires more resources and involves selection of components with appropriate 
levels of redundancy. RAP help to reduce a system FR which also results in a reliability increase 
of a system through appropriate optimisation process. An appropriate optimisation process as 
proposed by Ran & Chi-Ming, (2012) mostly targets to increase reliability as the best objective. 
Several other authors including Valian et al., (2013); Garg et al., (2014) & Sahoo et al., (2012) 
have published works buttressing the relevance of reliability optimisation, and have no doubt 
that reliability can consistently be improved upon by formulating and addressing RAP.  A 
proper RAP formulation can therefore be obtained traditionally to handle all systems 
redundancy levels.  
3.1 Traditional Formulation of Redundancy Allocation 
Problem 
Traditional RAP formulation handles multi-level redundancy and can be formulated as a 
general multi-objective optimisation problem to cope with redundancy at multi-level. This is 
mainly because, RAP is regarded as a multi-objective optimisation problem (Zai, 2009).  Multi-
Objective Optimisation Problem (MOOP), usually optimise objectives simultaneously. As a 
matter of fact, objectives can conflict such that preference for the best solution is unknown. 
For a such scenario, decision makers’ trade-off conflicting objectives and express preference 
over another. Many authors including Ouyang et al. (2015) have formulated MOOP using 
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different design parameters, but according to Marler & Arora (2004), general MOOPs can be 
best formulated as follows: 
 
                                                     Maximise   𝐅(𝐱)  = [𝐹1(x),𝐹2(x),… ,𝐹𝑘(x)]
𝑇 
x
                   3.1                                                                                                                                                                                 
                                           Subject to 𝑔𝑗(x) ≤ 0,   j = 1,2, … , 𝑚 
                                            where 𝑙 = 1,2, … , 𝑒, ℎ(𝑋) = 0                          
Where 𝑘 is referred to as the number of objective functions, 𝑚 is the number of inequality 
constraints, and 𝑒 is the number of equality constraints. x ∈ 𝐸𝑛 is vector of design variables (in 
other words, also known as decision variables), where 𝑛   is the number of independent 
variables 𝑥𝑖 .  𝐹(𝑥) ∈ 𝐸
𝑘  is a vector of objective function 𝐹𝑖 (𝑥): 𝐸
𝑛 →  𝐸1.   𝐹𝑖  (𝑥) are also 
referred to as objectives, criteria, payoff functions, cost functions, or value functions. The 
gradient of 𝐹𝑖 (x) with respect to x is written as ∇x𝐹𝑖 (x)  ∈ 𝐸
𝑛.  x𝑖* is the point that minimises 
the objective function  𝐹𝑖  (x). Any comparison (≤, ≥, etc. )  between the vectors applies to 
corresponding vector components. The feasible design space 𝐗  (often called the feasible 
decision space or constraint set) is defined as the set 
{x|𝑔𝑗(x) ≤ 0, 𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑚 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ℎ𝑖(x) = 0, 𝑙 = 1,2, … , 𝑒}. The feasible solution  𝒁  (also 
called cost space or the attainable set) is defined as the set {𝐹(x)|x ∈ 𝑋 }.  Feasible criterion 
space and attainable set are both used in the literature to describe  𝒁. There is an indirect 
distinction between the ideas of feasibility and attainability. While feasibility implies that no 
constraint is violated, attainability implies that a point in the criterion space maps to a point in 
the design space. Each point in the design space maps to a point in the criterion space, but the 
reverse may not be true; every point in the criterion space does not necessarily correspond to a 
single point  x ∈ 𝐗. Consequently, even with an unconstrained problem, only certain points in 
the criterion space are attainable to realise design objectives. 
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Actually, objectives changes and can either be for example to maximise cost whilst minimising 
weight of a system, and maximising performance whilst minimising the system energy 
consumption rate. As a result of this, it is unlikely that there exists a single best solution. One 
of the ways to handle such a situation can either be to transform the problem into a single 
objective problem by combining all design objectives to form a single aggregate objective 
function. Alternatively, to employ a weighting system to construct the overall function as 
applicable in the current practice. 
Weighting systems currently comprise a set of weighting factors and turning exponents. 
Turning exponents are referred to as the degree/level of importance attached to a single 
objective with respect to other objectives. Weighting factors represent the relative importance 
degrees of objectives having significant influence on the location of the final solution on the 
Pareto frontier. The fundamental goal of a multi-objective optimisation is to identify solutions 
in the Pareto optimal set and analyse the trade-off between conflicting objectives (Kitayama & 
Yamazaki, 2012). These solutions could be classified as non-dominated, Pareto optimal, Pareto 
efficient or non-inferior, if none of the objective functions can be improved in value without 
degrading some of the other objective values. However, identifying the entire Pareto optimal 
set for many multi-objective problems is practically difficult due to size. Furthermore, many 
problems especially combinatorial optimisation problems, to proof solution optimality is 
computationally infeasible. Based on this, a practical approach to multi-objective optimisation 
is the investigation of a set of solutions (the best known Pareto set) that represent the Pareto 
optimal set as well as possible (Konak et al., 2006). Considering these, a multi objective 
optimisation should have the following qualities: 
 The quality of ensuring that the best- known Pareto front is able to capture the whole 
spectrum of the Pareto front. This measure requires investigation of solutions at the 
extreme of the objective function space. 
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  The quality of distributing solutions in the best-known Pareto front uniformly, and 
diverse over the Pareto front in order to provide the decision- maker a true picture of 
trade-offs. 
 The quality of positioning the best-known Pareto front to be as close as possible to the 
true Pareto front. The reason is because in an ideal sense, the best- known Pareto set 
should be a subset of the Pareto optimal set. 
3.2 Pareto Optimality 
According to Marler Arora, (2004), under Pareto optimal; 
 𝐴 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡,   𝑥∗ ∈ 𝑋, 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑜 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑛𝑜 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑥 ∈  𝑋, 𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎat 
 𝐹(𝑥)  ≤ 𝐹(𝑥∗), 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐹(𝑥)  < 𝐹𝑖(𝑥
∗) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 . 
All Pareto optimal points lie on the boundary of feasible criterion space, but often there exists 
algorithms that provide solutions that may not be Pareto optimal but may satisfy other criteria. 
For example, weakly Pareto optimal; a point is said to be weakly Pareto optimal iff there is no 
other point that improves all the objective functions simultaneously. For example, a point, 𝑥∗ ∈
 𝑋, is weakly Pareto optimal iff there exists no other point, such that 𝑥 ∈  𝑋, such that 𝐹(𝑥) <
𝐹(𝑥∗)  as shown in Figure 3-1 
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Figure 3-1 Pareto optimal solution and feasible region (Hiroyasu et al., 2007) 
Figure 3-1 shows Pareto optimal solutions with respect to two objectives. The solid line shows 
the optimum solutions, while the dotted line shows the weak optimum solutions. From the 
Figure 3-1, no other point is capable of improving all the objective functions simultaneously. 
However, all Pareto optimal maybe categorised as either proper or improper. For proper Pareto 
optimal: A point, x∗ ∈ 𝑋 is said to be a proper Pareto optimal if it is already a Pareto optimal 
and there exists some real number 𝑀 > 0 such that for each 𝐹𝑖(x) and each x ∈ X satisfying 
𝐹𝑖(x) < 𝐹𝑖(x
∗), there exists at least one 𝐹𝑗(x) such that 𝐹𝑗(x
∗) < 𝐹𝑗(x) and 
𝐹𝑖(x
∗)−𝐹𝑖(x)
𝐹𝑗(x)−𝐹𝑗(x∗)
 ≤
𝑀 (Geoffrion, 1968). The quotient is referred to as trade-off, and it represents the increment in 
the objective function 𝑗 resulting from a decrement in objective function 𝑖. Geoffrion, (1968) 
and Ghosh, (2014) maintained that if a Pareto optimal point falls short of the above condition 
enumerated, then it is said to be improper. That is, a point  x∗ ∈ 𝑋 is called a weak or improper 
Pareto optimal point if there is no other point x ∈ 𝑋  such that  𝐹(𝑥)  ≤ 𝐹(𝑥∗) .  
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3.3 Methods of Solving Multi-Objectives Optimisation 
Problems 
 
The mathematics of the multi-objective decision model is not new. Many research works have 
been carried out by different authors to advance their area of interest by adopting different 
suitable multi-objective optimisation methods. There are different methods of solving multi-
objective optimisation problems. For some methods, transforming the original problem into a 
sequence of single objective optimisation problems is necessary. A transformed multi-
objective optimisation problem into a sequence of single objectives, leads to solving numerical 
problems involving a nonlinear optimisation technique. This method remarkably allows the 
designer to have great flexibility during decision making. In either method preference is given, 
involves good computational effort in numerical determination of the Pareto optimal set. For 
the purpose of clarity, preference is an intrinsic function (i.e. points in the criterion space) that 
exist in the mind of the decision –maker, which perfectly incorporates his/her preferences. For 
example, selecting a set of weights that reflects preference towards one objective or another 
can be difficult, and preferences tend to be discrete. Secondly, on the manner in which the 
transformations exercise of an original problem into a sequence of single objective optimisation 
is implemented. There are several other methods of multi-objective optimisation solutions as 
discussed in the below subsections.  
3.3.1 Weighted Sum Method 
Under this type of method, the problem is transformed to a single objective by combining all 
design objectives and forming a single aggregate function. In other words, the objective 
function (𝑈) becomes a weighted sum of the objective functions of the multiple objective 
decision model as exemplified below.       
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                                                    𝑈 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
𝐹𝑖(𝑥)                                                           (3.2)       
where  𝑤𝑖 ≥ 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 {𝑤𝑖} ≠ 0, “ if any one of the weights is zero, there is a potential for the 
solution to be only weakly Pareto Optimal” ( Marler & Arora, 2010). 
This model is advantageous due to its simplicity. By altering the weighting factors {𝑤𝑖}, a set 
of Pareto solutions can be generated. In order words, the weighting factors {𝑤𝑖}  reflect the 
relative importance of various objective functions, and it is straight- forward to implement the 
algorithm. The weighting factors also have significant influence on the location of the final 
solution on the Pareto frontier due to the direction of search.  Normally, search is directed 
towards the points closer to endpoints corresponding to the objectives that have been 
considered more important. First, the Pareto optimal points corresponding to the boundaries of 
solution space are obtained by carrying out separate optimisation on each objective function. 
Followed by a systematic alteration of weighting factors {𝑤𝑖} until a sufficient number of 
Pareto optimal solutions are found. Naidu et al., (2014) successfully applied this method to 
optimise a controller’s parameter of a Load Frequency Control (LFC) of an Electrical Power 
System. The only shortcoming about this method is that, it can be difficult to distinguish 
between setting weights to compensate for differences in objective-function magnitudes and 
setting weights to indicate the relative importance of an objective. 
3.3.2 Decomposition-Based Method 
This method employs a scalarizing function in order to carryout conventional optimisation. By 
this method, the multi –objective problem is reduced to a set of single objective problems for 
the purpose of solving it easily. In this context, “easy” simply implies that the problems assume 
a straightforward shape in which upon the solution yields a good approximation of the set of 
optimal solutions (Giagkiozis & Fleming, 2015). A typical example of this method was adopted 
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by Zhang & Li, (2007), they both successfully used decomposition based strategy to 
decompose the multi-objective optimisation problem into a number of scalar optimisation sub-
problems, and simultaneously optimised them. The method proved to be very good in terms of 
performance. According to Zhang & Li, (2007), apart from the appreciable performance levels, 
each sub-problem was optimised using only information from several neighbouring sub-
problems to reduce computational complexity at each generation. 
3.3.3 Converting Objectives to Constraints Method 
This conversion method advocates for all-but-one design objectives to be treated as constraints. 
The multi-objective optimisation problem is transformed to a single objective and is prone to 
conflict the design objectives. Therefore, in event of conflicting objectives, the solution 
obtained by this approach is a single point on the Pareto frontier of the original problem. The 
reason is because the designer consciously imposed direct constraints on the locus of the 
solution prior to start of the optimisation (Lin, 1976). For example, supposing a design for 
minimisation of (x) was anticipated, where (x)  is any suitable objective(s), the problem 
formulation to convert (x) to constraints is demonstrated below:              
  
 
 
 
 
 
 𝑥 = {𝑥1, 𝑥2 , … , 𝑥𝑛},   𝑓 = {𝑓1, 𝑓2 , … , 𝑓𝑚}                                                                      (3.3) 
𝑚𝑖𝑛  𝑓(𝑥) 
 𝑥 ∈ ℜ𝑛 ; 𝑓 ∈ ℜ𝑚 
 
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑔𝑖(𝑥) = 0 
ℎ𝑗(𝑥) ≤ 0 
min 𝑓 𝑑 (𝑥) 
 𝑥 ∈ ℜ𝑛 
 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑔𝑖(𝑥) = 0 
                                 ℎ𝑗(𝑥) ≤ 0                       
                                𝑔′
𝑘
 (𝑥) = 0 
                           ℎ′𝑙 (𝑥) ≤ 0 
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Successful practice of this method was implemented in electrical power and energy systems 
(Zhang & Liu, 2008). These authors converted the multi-objective problem into a single-
objective problem using the fuzzy optimisation technique. The fuzzy optimisation technique 
idea is to simultaneously optimise objective function and constraints, which also achieved a 
global performance index of the problem.  
3.3.4 Goal Programming Method 
The goal programming method is one of the fundamental methods of solving multi-objective 
optimisation problems. Many authors have given excellent definitions about the method with 
respect to its usefulness in solving problems. To this effect, the author will refer to a definition 
made by Saber & Ravindran, (1996), that “the method is used for solving problems with 
conflicting objectives, in which the user provides a goal or targets of achievement for each 
objective and prioritizes the order in which the goals have to be achieved. It then finds an 
optimal solution that satisfies as many of the goals as in the specified order”. The mathematics 
surrounding this method is detailed in Mohammad, (2013). Such mathematics has limitation to 
particularly address linear functions. However, it can still be applied to solve specific industrial 
problems. This limitation cannot be said to have an adverse effect concerning this method 
hence, the linear programming technique can be used to solve large nonlinear optimisation 
problems (Ravi, 2005). Additionally, the goal programming problems are mostly present in 
design due to the number of constraints. Some of these constraints if not all, maybe in mutual 
conflict where by finding for example, a vector 𝑍 becomes impossible where all the constraints 
are satisfied. The objective of the above problem might be to locate the solution that approaches 
the target values of constraints or goal as closely as possible. 
Assuming 𝑑𝑘
−  and 𝑑𝑘
+ represent the deviations from the constraint or functional requirement 
target value of 𝑏𝑘, the objective is therefore  to minimise;      
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                                                                          𝑈 = ∑ 𝜌𝑘
𝑘
𝑘=1
(𝑤𝑘
−𝑑𝑘
− + 𝑤𝑘
+𝑑𝑘
+)                     (3.4)       
Where: 
𝑈 is the objective function, 𝜌𝑘 is priority for goal constraint 𝑘; 𝑑𝑘
− 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑘
+ are deviations from 
the target value of 𝑏𝑘;  𝑤𝑘
− 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑘
+  are weights associated with deviational variables 
𝑑𝑘
− 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑘
+. 
In this problem (goal) formulation, each goal objective is now represented below; 
              𝑐𝑘(𝑍) + 𝑑𝑘
− − 𝑑𝑘
+ = 𝑏𝑘                                                                                  (3.5𝑎 )      
  0 ≤ 𝑑𝑘
−, 𝑑𝑘
+ ≤ 1                                                                                              (3.5𝑏) 
  𝑑𝑘
− × 𝑑𝑘
+ = 0                                                                                                      (3.5𝑐) 
𝑐𝑘(𝑍)  is the goal expression, and it is normalised by division with appropriate value. 
𝑑𝑘
− 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑘
+  are the deviational variables. Only non-negative values can be used for these 
deviational variables for the expression above to be meaningful, as these variables represent 
the achievement of the target value 𝑏𝑘 . Achievement of goal is in two ways; that is under and 
over-achievement, but cannot possibly achieve both goals simultaneously. In this case, either 
one or both of the deviations must be a zero value. Thus, the weighted sum of deviations from 
goals is minimised. For goals that can be exceeded, that is 𝑐𝑘(𝑍) ≥ 𝑏𝑘, 𝑤𝑘
+ would be zero while 
𝑤𝑘
− would be 1, since it is needless to minimise over-achievement, but needful to minimise 
under-achievement. Given the same similitude for thresholds that are to be kept within the 
associated weights, 𝑤𝑘
− 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑘
+ will be 1 and zero. That is,  𝑤𝑘
+ would be 1 and 𝑤𝑘
− would be 
zero. Therefore, in accordance with the above explored dynamics, experimenting the choice of 
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priorities and weights is necessary in order to obtain the solution that reflects the preferred 
value system, because they dictate the solution. 
Furthermore, the appropriate values of priorities and weights to assign to the deviational 
variables would solely depend on what is expected of a design. For instance, if the aim is to 
arrive at a design with certain key performance characteristics, then the rational procedure 
would be to assign higher relative priorities to appropriate deviational variables corresponding 
to those requirements. Thus, the approach is in contrast with the traditional optimisation 
approach to problems, where the values of the independent design variables dictate the solution. 
In this method, it is the values of the deviational variables that determines the values of the 
independent design variables. 
Based on Archimedean (i.e., regarding parameter estimation) formulation Hering & Ulrich, 
(2012), the priority values may be one of two types or a combination of them:  
∑(𝑤𝑘
− + 𝑤𝑘
+
𝑘
𝑘=1
) = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝜌𝑘 = 1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝐾                                                (3.6) 
Again, 𝜌𝑘 is chosen such that they represent pre-emptive priorities, i.e. 
 𝜌1 ≫   𝜌2 …  ≫ 𝜌𝐾 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑘
− = 𝑤𝑘
+ = 1.0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑘 =  1,2, … , 𝐾                                       (3.7)   
3.3.4.1 Generic Goal Programming Problem 
The general goal programming mathematics of a problem is shown below. In its nature, it can 
obviously require satisfaction of some constraints to ensure feasibility as formulated:-  
Find 
 {𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑁}
𝑇, 𝑑𝑘
−, 𝑑𝑘
+, 𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝐾                                                                        (3.8𝑎) 
 (Decision and deviational variables) 
Subject to: 
 𝑔𝑖(𝑍) ≥ 0, 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝐼                                                                                                 (3.8𝑏) 
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 (Both linear and nonlinear inequality constraints) 
 ℎ𝑖(𝑍) = 0, 𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝐽                                                                                          (3.8𝑐) 
 (Both linear and nonlinear equality constraints) 
 𝑐𝑘(𝑍) + 𝑑𝑘
− − 𝑑𝑘
+ = 0, 𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝐾                                                                     (3.8𝑑)     
 (Both linear and nonlinear goal constraints) 
 𝑍𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑍 ≤ 𝑍𝑚𝑎𝑥 , 0 ≤ 𝑑𝑘
−, 𝑑𝑘
+ ≤ 1, 𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝐾                                               (3.8𝑒) 
 (bound on both design and deviational variables) 
Minimise  
                                             𝑈 = ∑ 𝜌𝑘
𝑘
𝑘=1
(𝑤𝑘
−𝑑𝑘
− + 𝑤𝑘
+𝑑𝑘
+)                                              (3.8𝑓) 
  (Weighted sum of deviational variables) 
Priority type of the formulated problem can go in two ways: Pre-emptive or Archimedean as 
earlier stated. One of the successful applications of this method in problem solving was likened 
to Bertolini & Maurizio, (2006) who defined the best strategies for the maintenance of critical 
centrifugal pumps in an oil refinery using this method.  
3.3.5 Trade Off On Pareto Front Method 
This methodology is more recent, no weight system is used and the search process forms the 
Pareto frontier, or its approximation. It consists of splitting the solution procedure into two 
phases. The first phase selects the set of non-dominated trade-off solutions (Pareto frontier 
solutions) within the whole space of feasible ones with respect to the constraints. As stated 
earlier, a solution is considered as non-dominated if it is better than the others with relation to 
at least one objective. The second phase handles solutions belonging to the Pareto optimal, 
evaluates and compares them for the purpose of selecting the best. That is, the decision maker 
evaluates the generated design alternatives against the assessment criteria and looks for trade-
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off solutions, subject to high computational time and effort.  The reality of this method was 
demonstrated by Chapman, (2014), who explored Pareto front method and allowed inferior 
solutions to be removed from further consideration.  
3.3.6 Convex Optimisation Method 
The convex optimisation method is relatively one of the newest methods, with a well-defined 
mathematical optimisation approach towards getting a reliable and efficient solution. A lot of 
problems can be solved using this method provided the problems can be formulated as a convex 
optimisation. Whilst Maxim, (2014) formulated the convex problem and added that it can be 
applied to a wide variety of cost functions beyond classical formulations, Michael & Jon, (2014) 
demonstrated the usefulness of the convex optimisation framework in solving many different 
cost function problems. Several authors including Mohammed et al., (2014) have also done 
work using this method. Other methods of optimisation include but is not limited to linear least 
square method, genetic algorithm (GA) and the upgraded version of genetic algorithm methods 
otherwise referred to as Non-dominated sorted genetic algorithm (NSGA-II). An extensive 
literature on how GA and NSGA-II can be implemented for optimal functionality is explored in 
the later section of this chapter.  
3.4 Techniques of Solving Multi-Objective Optimisation 
There are different types of techniques such as Tabu search, Vector Evaluated Genetic 
Algorithm (VEGA), Multi-Objective Genetic Algorithm (MOGA), Niched Pareto Genetic 
Algorithm (NPGA), Weight-Based Genetic Algorithm (WBGA), Random Weighted Genetic 
Algorithm (RWGA), Strength Pareto Evolutionary Algorithm (SPEA), Improved Strength 
Pareto Evolutionary Algorithm (SPEA 2), Pareto-Archived Evolution Strategy (PAES), Pareto 
Envelop-based Selection Algorithm (PESA), Region-based Selection in Evolutionary  Multi-
objective Optimisation (PESA-II), Multi-objective Evolutionary Algorithm (MEA), Micro-GA, 
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Rank Density Based Genetic Algorithm (RDGA), and Dynamic Multi-objective Evolutionary 
Algorithm (DMOEA).  
Other techniques, however, have been used in getting optimal solutions of a multi-objective 
problem. There are credible algorithms that have been used in a variety of applications, and 
their performances have been promising in several comparative studies. Whilst one of such 
studies can be found in Konak, (2006), who extensively discussed most of these techniques 
featuring their merits and demerits, the overview of a few of these techniques are explained 
below with relevant references from the literature indicating their areas of application.  
Tabu search (TS) technique is a meta-heuristic search proposed by Glover in the 1980’s for the 
purpose of solving combinatorial optimisation problems. It is ordinarily driven by simple but 
very efficient ideas to get almost optimal solutions for various types of difficult combinatorial 
optimisation problems. The technique is dominated by neighbourhood solutions in searching 
for optimal solution. Unlike GA, TS is highly dependent on the values of the algorithm’s control 
parameters (Liang & Chao, 2008). The search commences when the parameters are chosen and 
a feasible solution to the problem is generated. Accordingly, the search operator referred to as 
‘move’ can be altered in order to generate neighbourhood solutions. This operator has the 
tendency to place each element to move from its ideal location in the solution to any other 
alternative location within the solution space. Therefore, a set of neighbouring solutions are 
generated from ‘move’ through a pre-defined change to the current solution, in order to pave 
way for the best solution to be selected. The best solution is then selected from the current set 
of neighbouring solutions and becomes the new current solution. In this order, a new set of 
neighbouring solutions is further generated specifically from the new current solution. The 
process is recursively applied until the stopping criteria are achieved. Tabu list restrictions and 
the aspiration criteria of the solution associated with these restrictions are two main 
components of TS (Katsigiannis & Geogilakis, 2008). With respect to Tabu list restriction, it 
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is referred to as the adaptive memory in the sense that, some attributes are temporarily fixed, 
provided they are in the tabu list. In addition, proper choice of the tabu list size is very critical 
to the algorithm’s success, and it depends on the nature of the problem. Tabu lists are managed 
by recording ‘moves’ in order in which they are made. When a new attribute finds its way into 
the tabu list, the oldest one is then released.  Aspiration criteria have the tendency of overriding 
tabu restrictions if a certain move is unacceptable. Also, when satisfied, the aspiration criteria 
can reactivate this move. It is therefore very important to appropriately make use of such 
criteria to enable the TS technique to achieve best performance levels. Several successful 
research works have been carried out in TS techniques subject area. Amongst them are; 
optimisation of production cost while minimizing the amount of power loss in the power 
system Naama et al., (2013), and optimal load distribution strategy problem for a cooling 
system constituted by multiple chiller water units (Zhang & Zhang, 2010). 
Vector evaluated genetic algorithm (Vega) is a special multi-objective technique due to its 
straightforwardness. It was originally the idea of Schaffer in the mid 1980’s to use Vega in 
solving problems in a manner that the selection process is carried out independently for each 
criterion. This includes performing mating and crossover across subpopulation boundaries. It 
is less time complex because the approach does not need to transform multi-objective values 
into one value, and does not equally calculate each individual’s dominant level based on a 
dominated relationship (Zhang &Fujimura, 2010). In other words, it rather divides the 
population into sub-populations, each of which evolve towards a single objective. This makes 
VEGA straightforward and somewhat amazing at first glance. However, the characteristics of 
VEGA cause selection bias, therefore the quality of solutions obtained using this approach may 
not be fantastic hence, VEGA approach lacks diversity as a major drawback. VEGA was proved 
inefficient when compared with other methods whilst solving multi-objective process planning 
and schedule (PPS) problems, to determine a schedule solution (Zhang &Fujimura, 2010).  
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3.5 Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm (NSGA-II): 
A Method for Solving Multi-objective problems 
As stated earlier NSGA-II is upgraded version of genetic algorithm (GA) method and therefore 
starts in similar approach as the GA. The GA methodology starts by generating a random 
population of 𝑁 chromosomes (i.e., suitable solutions for the problem).  
3.5.1 Genetic Algorithm (GA) 
Recall that GA is a meta-heuristic search technique for solving optimisation (both single and 
multi-objectives) problems (Jones et al., 2002). The technique is inspired by evolutionary 
theory. In nature, unfit species (chromosomes) within their environment (population) are faced 
with extinction by natural selection. Stronger ones have better chances of passing their genes 
to future generations through reproduction operators. Subsequently, species carrying the 
correct combination in their genes becomes dominant. Random changes (mutation) take place 
sometimes during the evolution process, and the new offspring may be retained or got rid of 
depending on their fitness value (Okafor & Sun, 2012). 
A GA commences with a series of initial solutions, referred to as initial population. This 
population is normally generated randomly. GA handles the individuals contained in the 
generation as parents for the basis of producing children to form a new generation. Each 
individual in the population is evaluated and is assigned fitness. The quality of population (the 
average fitness and the maximum fitness) increases generation by generation. Making children 
is by mating parents which is referred to as crossover (one of the reproduction operators). 
Individuals with good fitness in GA have more chance of being selected as parents, in order to 
increase the probability of producing children with good fitness. It is always very possible to 
reproduce a child that is fitter than its parents if the parents are not already the fittest choice 
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(global optima). Mutation is another GA reproduction operator that is based on a random 
selection and random change, targeting to explore all search domains (i.e., global search).  
In GA terminology, a solution vector x ∈ 𝑋  is called an individual or a chromosome. 
Chromosomes are made of discrete units called genes. Each gene controls one or more features 
of the chromosomes. Originally, GA genes are assumed to be binary digits, but in the later 
implementations, more varied gene types have been introduced (Konak et al., 2006). Normally, 
a chromosome corresponds to a unique solution  x  in the solution space. This requires a 
mapping mechanism between the solution space and the chromosomes. The mapping is 
referred to as encoding. GA work on the encoding of a problem, rather than on the problem 
itself. In general, GA is a population- based technique that is capable of solving multi-objective 
optimisation problems. Several works have been done using GA, including Moura et al., (2015), 
who used the GA technique to define an efficient inspection program in terms of inspection 
cost and risk level that complied with restrictions imposed by international standards.  
The procedure of the GA methodology according to Sadrzadeh, (2012) is given as follows: 
First step: Set 𝑡 = 1 . Randomly generate 𝑁  solutions to form the initial population, 𝑃1 . 
Evaluate 𝑃1 solutions fitness. 
Second step: crossover. Crossover operation is simply to make children by mating parents. In 
general, the operation takes place on two parent chromosomes at a time and it is also referred 
to as binary variation. It generates offspring by combining the features of both parents through 
exchange of genes. Since it is not unusual for child chromosomes to inherit some features of 
the parent chromosomes, the crossover operation is applied in anticipation of producing better 
sets of the existing parent with stronger fitness, thus this is dependent on the environment. Take 
for example, a family where one parent has exceptional liking for a Chemistry subject, and the 
other parent has excellent English communication skills. When the chromosomes of these 
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parents are combined, the progeny will be produced comprising of the both parents features, 
where it will be expected that at least one of the children will have both a liking for chemistry, 
and excellent English communication skills. So if the fitness is anchored or judged on the 
grounds of these acquired skills (environment), then the new child will be valued over either 
of its parents. The inheritance of good genes from parents to child chromosomes plays an 
effective exploration role in the search space. This is because each new and fitter child 
chromosome is in fact, a new point (solution) in the total search space. 
There are different types of crossover operations, thus depending on the type of chromosome 
representation. For array or typical string chromosomes representation, Single-point, multi-
point and uniform types of crossover are mostly adopted. These crossover types usually have 
defined crossover probability, as successful crossover is the one with defined crossover 
probability. However, probability of crossover is highly problem dependant so the parameter 
deserves to be selected properly to suit the problem. Improper selection of this parameter can 
result in the following; 
 Premature convergence (that is, the solution is trapped in a local optima) and 
 Delay in solution convergence (that is, an inefficient algorithm). 
Solution trapped in local optima is not in the best interest of the GA objective, particularly as 
regards to optimisation. The overall purpose of an optimisation is to find the best value of a 
function after taking into account all relevant parameters and constraints. This value literally 
dominates all other possible values of the function in the solution space, thus it depends on the 
optimisation objectives. For an optimisation objective that has to do with minimisation, then 
the best value gotten from the optimisation is exceeded by all other values of the function. 
Similar to this, if the optimisation goal is based on maximising the objective function, the best 
derived value arising from the optimisation process exceeds all other possible values which 
may exist on the solution space of the function. An Optimisation process with appropriately 
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defined and applied crossover parameters that represents such desirous characteristics of either 
being minimised or maximised is regarded as the ‘global optimum’ of a function. In a nutshell, 
whilst a global optimum represents a point in a search space where all other points are either 
worse or equal to the best value, local optimum represent the best solution for each region. The 
importance of this is occasioned in most situations where the search space is wide and divided 
into various regions; the global optimum for a particular region may not be uniform with 
regards to the global optimum of the other neighbouring regions. For this reason, the candidate 
further refers reader to Figure 3-2 where clear demonstration concerning global optimum and 
local optimum solutions are extensively demonstrated. 
 
   
      Figure 3-2 A Function F(X), global optimum and local optimum   
Figure 3-2 gives credence to the earlier explanation as it shows different types of function’s 
optimum values. It shows that global optimum can be maximum and minimum, as well as local 
optimum. For Maximum function F(𝑋) , the global optimum is located in three distinctive 
regions within the design search space, which also shows the different values of 𝑋 variables. 
And for minimisation of function  𝐹(𝑋), the Figure clearly demonstrates two instances at 
which the referred global optimum values can be found. In general, the second step generates 
an offspring population 𝑈𝑡 as follows: 
 Choose two solutions x and y from 𝑃𝑡 based on the fitness values. 
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 Using a crossover operator, generate offspring and add them to 𝑈𝑡. 
Third step: Mutation: Mutate each solution 𝑥 ∈ 𝑈𝑡 with a predefined mutation rate. 
Fourth step: Assignment of fitness: Evaluate and assign a fitness value to each solution 𝑥 ∈ 𝑈𝑡 
based on its objective function value. 
Fifth step: Selection: Select 𝑁 solutions from 𝑈𝑡 based on their fitness and copy them to 𝑃𝑡+1. 
Sixth step: If the stopping criterion is satisfied, terminate the search and return to the current 
population, otherwise, set 𝑡 = 𝑡 + 1 go to second step.  
With respect to the GA Selection process, there are different types of selection processes. Thus, 
the application of them depends on the nature of the problem.  Amongst them are; Random 
selection of generated solutions, direct selection of first generated fittest solutions, 
Deterministic selection, Tournament selection, Elitism Selection and Roulette Wheel selection 
process. Parents can successfully be selected in readiness for crossover. During selection, it is 
however suitable to have chromosomes with the potential of providing best solutions given the 
most opportunity, while the less suitable chromosomes should not be completely eradicated 
from the population in order to ensure diversity in the population (Xue & Wang, 2015). GA 
can also be somewhat challenging in terms of having better solutions due to early solution 
convergence, or trapped in local optimal if inappropriate reproduction operators values such as 
probability of crossover and probability of mutation are selected. In most possible cases, GA 
may even have difficulty in handling constraints. 
However, given the exceptional flexibility of GA as explored in the literature, GA has: 
 Flexibility in modelling of engineering problems. That is, it has no strict mathematical 
requirements, such as derivative requirement, on the objective functions and constraints. 
The only requirement is that the objective function constraints can be evaluated in some 
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way. Additionally, GA is also suitable for dealing with those problems including 
discrete design variables. 
 Global optimisation ability, GA has been recognised as one of the most effective 
approaches in searching for the global optimal solution (Zhigang & Ming Zuo, 2006).    
 
3.5.2 Characteristics of NSGA-II in Handling Multi-Objective 
Problems 
NSGA-II handles multi-objective optimisation algorithms with three special characteristics; 
fast non-dominated sorting approach, fast crowded distance estimation procedure and simple 
crowded comparison operator. In addition, it provides a much better spread of solutions and 
better convergence near Pareto-Optimal front (Kalyanmoy et al., 2002). NSGA-II algorithm 
adopts the fast non-dominated sorting technique and a crowding distance to rank and select the 
population fronts. In order to ensure elitism, NSGA-II employs the standard bimodal crossover 
and polynomial operators in combining the current population together with the generated 
offspring as the next generation. The best individuals in terms of non-dominance and diversity 
are then selected as the solutions. For example, a front for a population member (a solution 𝑘) 
is determined by the number of solutions that dominate 𝑘  and the number of solutions 
dominated by 𝑘. The fitness of an individual is assigned according to its front. Based on that, 
the population is then filled up with solutions from the remaining fronts when the size of the 
first front is smaller than the size of the population. Clearly, a few fundamental advantages 
about NSGA-II are; (a) it avoids the difficulty of setting sharing parameters, and equally has a 
low time complexity of O(𝑁𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁), where 𝑁  is the population size (Huang et al., 2010). 
O(𝑁𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁), means that it can carry out sorting very easily. An orderly explained NSGA-II 
algorithm flow chart is shown in Figure 3-3. 
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Figure 3-3 NSGA-II Flowchart (Zahra et al., 2015)   
3.5.3 Fitness:  
Based on Figure 3-3, having generated the initial population as stated earlier, it is normally 
followed with fitness evaluation of each multi-objective chromosome in the population. This 
is mainly to ascertain how close a given design solution is able to achieve the set aim. As stated 
above, each designed solution is commonly represented as a string of numbers (chromosome). 
Gen = Gen+1 
Start 
Initialize the population  
Evaluate the fitness of each 
individual 
Identifying dominant Chromosomes 
and ranking them 
Calculation of crowding distance for 
member of each rank 
Selection of chromosomes 
Chromosomes 
numbers=Initial 
Population number 
Identifying dominant Chromosomes 
and ranking them  Yes 
Crossover & Mutation  
Gen < Max 
generation size 
  No 
Represent the first Pareto front 
Yes 
Gen = 1 
Stop 
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Fitness idea is to get rid of the worst design solutions, whilst the best design solutions are 
accommodated in the new generation. Based on this, each solution is awarded a figure of merit 
(i.e., a quality used in characterizing the designed system performance relative to its 
alternatives). Very often in NSGA-II, the figure of merit adopted is with respect to maximum 
and minimum functions (i.e., Maximin) as first proposed by Richard Balling (Balling, 2000 & 
Balling, 2003). 
A fitness function problem is formulated below for a given solution. Considering a 
minimization problem with 𝑘 objectives to solve based on a population based algorithm, the 
fitness of 𝑖𝑡ℎ individuals in the population with Maximin fitness function approach becomes: 
 𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑖 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑗≠𝑖 (𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑘 (𝑓𝑖
𝑖 − 𝑓𝑘
𝑗))                                                                                (3.9) 
The Min function is gotten from all the design objectives, while the Max function is gotten 
from all the individuals in the population (Alemzadeh & Dastghaibyfard, 2013). 
In addition, the Maximin fitness function enhances in getting the following information: 
 The information that identifies exact dominated individuals (𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑖 > 0) as well as 
non-dominated individuals  (𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑖 < 0) . In other words, the weakly 
dominated(𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑖 = 0). 
 Rewards non-dominated solutions in less crowded regions and penalizes the crowded 
individual found in the crowded areas. That is; to carry out clustering of non-dominated 
solutions. 
However, the shortcomings with Maximin fitness function is the inability to identify better 
solutions to keep for the next generation in a situation where a multiple non-dominated solution 
is achieved under the same Maximin fitness function. Additionally, the fitness of a non-
dominated solution may be adversely affected by a dominated solution if the fitness function 
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is not modified. In the year 2001, Balling further modified the fitness function to avoid adverse 
effects on solutions by ensuring that Maximin fitness function of a non-dominated solution is 
unable to be controlled by non-dominated solutions. The modified Maximin fitness version is 
as follows:  
𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑖 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑗≠𝑖,𝑗∈𝑁 (𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑘 (𝑓𝑖
𝑖 − 𝑓𝑘
𝑗))                                                                             (3.10) 
where 𝑁 is the size of Non-dominated solutions.  
3.5.4 Ranking 
In conventional multi-objective problems, where a non-dominated solution is achieved, each 
chromosome is assigned a rank, and it is important to maintain a good spread of the solutions 
in the optimum fronts. For this purpose, NSGA-II uses the crowed-comparison mechanism for 
preserving diversity among the population members. And for every chromosome in a Pareto 
front, a crowding distance is ascertained as the distance of the largest cuboid contacting the 
two neighbouring solutions, as depicted in Figure 3-4 (Ali & Arezoo, 2014). 
 
                          
Figure 3-4 NSGA-II crowded distance (Ali & Arezoo, 2014) 
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The above Figure 3-4 shows that, for single objective function, the boundary solutions with the 
maximum function value point A and a minimum function value point B are usually given 
large distance values that may term to infinity, and these solutions, which are in the extremes 
of the non-dominating front, deserve to be emphasized more than the immediate solutions. To 
emphasize that, the distance space between two consecutive points in the Pareto set must be 
measured using Equation (3.11) 
 d𝑖
𝑠𝑝 = √∑(𝑓𝑘 (x)𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑓𝑘(x)𝑚𝑖𝑛)2
𝑚
𝑘=𝑖
                                                                            (3.11) 
where;  
  d𝑖
𝑠𝑝
 is the distance between successive Pareto fronts. 
 𝑚 is the maximum number of objective functions. 
 𝑓𝑘 (x)
𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the maximum of the 𝑘𝑡ℎ  objective between the two consecutive points in the 
Pareto set. 
 𝑓𝑘(x)
𝑚𝑖𝑛  is the minimum of the 𝑘𝑡ℎ objective between the two consecutive points in the 
Pareto set. 
Also, to account for the extremities of the solutions in a standard NSGA-II, a new matric 
capable of measuring every distance between all solutions and the extreme points in the 
Pareto set is defined. This defined metric is referred to as closeness-distance, see Figure 3-5. 
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Figure 3-5 NSGA-II Closeness-distance (Ali & Arezoo, 2014)  
Figure 3-5 depicts NSGA-II closeness-distance, whilst Equation 3.11 is the computation of 
the closeness -distance which considers every individual 𝑖 (𝑖 = 1𝑡𝑜 𝑁). With respect to every 
objectives function  (𝑗 = 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑘), it is given by Equation 3.12 in order to be ranked. 
                d𝑖,𝑗 =
𝑓𝑗
𝑖 − 𝑓𝑗
𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑓𝑗
𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑓𝑗
𝑚𝑖𝑛
                                                                                             (3.12) 
From Equation 3.12,    d𝑖,𝑗 is the normalised dimensionless value that differs from Zero in the 
boundary solution A to 1 in the most distant solution. In this case, the most distant solution 
from Figure 3-5 is solution B in the Pareto front. While  𝑓𝑗
𝑚𝑖𝑛 and 𝑓𝑗
𝑚𝑎𝑥 are the minimum and 
the maximum values of the objective function 𝑗 respectively in the population, and 𝑓𝑗
𝑖 is the 
value of the objective function 𝑗 in the solution 𝑖.  The boundary solutions between two 
extreme solutions, as well as the solutions close to them, are further emphasized through a 
selection process, which only takes place after new population has been created. 
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3.6 Chapter Summary 
Summarily, traditional redundancy allocation problem (RAP) is simply a multi-objective 
optimisation problem (MOOP). Therefore, addressing RAP using any suitable MOOP approach 
is a welcome idea. In addition to that, the candidate presented a variety of approaches and 
techniques of MOOP and established that the NSGA-II method was the most suitable to adopt 
for successful delivery of this project hence, the approach is flexible and gives a better spread 
of solutions, gives a good level of convergence if selection criteria are handled especially in 
terms of assigning pc and pm values. Assignment of improper pc and pm can result in premature 
convergence or solution been trapped in a local optimum. Therefore, given these highlighted 
features of NSGA-II, in the following chapter four, NSGA-II methodology is adopted for multi-
level formulation. This formulation constitutes the delivery of this project aim, and it has been 
proven as a general redundancy allocation problem.  
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4. Multi-Level Formulation 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Multi-level formulation (MLF) is a process of formulating a system with its associated 
components to various levels. It is a redundancy allocation problem (RAP), which can be 
difficult to solve. RAP is a nondeterministic polynomial-time hard (NP-hard) problem, 
meaning it is difficult to solve. To solve RAP, many proposed heuristic and meta-heuristic 
methods have only been successful on a single level system.  For a multi-level system, as 
referred in this chapter as multi-level formulation (MLF), RAP challenges still persist. A high 
level reliability is certainly a crucial target in MLF. Reliability of components in such a system 
is usually fixed, and one of the alternative ways to enhance system reliability is simply to 
allocate more redundancies in parallel. To achieve that, usually normally attracts additional 
resources such as cost and materials.  
4.2 Multi-Level Formulation State-of –the Art 
The literature surrounding MLF is simply evolutionary. They evolve alongside with the 
technology. That is, as technology evolves across the board, it gives room for modern systems 
to consist of several functionalities and levels. This evolution also places more challenges on 
research. In recent times, research concerning MLF has now gradually extended to other 
domains beyond the study of combining a purely parallel or series connection to a larger scale 
component combination, under several limitations such as cost, weight, and volume. MLF is 
more complicated considering that replacing components in the sublevels can directly influence 
its upper and lower levels in certain cases. For example, series system case under usual 
stochastic order redundancy at component level can be better than redundancy at system levels 
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for series systems. However, this is not applicable on parallel systems as redundancies on 
parallel system level is as good as the redundancies at components level.  
To date, under MLF, once a decision is reached on redundancy, it becomes necessary to 
examine how deployment of redundancy can successfully be made. Systems get examined, and 
depending on the examination outcome, a decision to either duplicate the entire system or only 
duplicate a certain component that is identified for duplication can be decided. If any of the 
components are identified for duplication, then the same component is duplicated in parallel to 
actualise system reliability. Moreover, reliability can be increased in a variety of ways, but the 
choice absolutely depends on the nature of the system. In certain systems, the use of 
redundancy may not provide the optimal solution, considering systems in which the minimum 
size, cost and weight are overriding considerations and objectives.  A major challenge in 
redundancy allocation is therefore, how to handle the impacts (i.e., increase in cost and weight) 
created as a result of additional components on the system for reliability purposes.  Whilst 
earlier works have been mainly limited to single objective optimisation of simple systems 
(Painton & Campbell, 1995), more recently challenges due to configuration of series, parallel 
and complex (Hsieh & Yeh, 2012) and Sun et al., (2008) and state of configuration 
“static/dynamic” (Ahmed & Abul, 2011) have been tackled.   
4.2.1 Reliability Model for Multi-Level Formulation 
A typical redundancy allocation model of a system involves multiple hierarchical levels. That 
is, from the topmost level, down to the lowest level. These levels are the topmost level, which 
represents the system. The module level is located between the topmost level and the second 
lowest levels, and finally the lowest level which represents the component level. Modules can 
have any number of subordinate components to form a system as depicted in Figure 4-1. The 
Figure depicts a typical general multi-level redundancy allocation showing the logical 
relationship that exists among the modules at different levels, in which some maybe in series, 
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parallel or a combination of both.  This makes it necessary to always understand, for example 
which system configuration is to undergo reliability calculation.  For a series- parallel system, 
the mathematical formulation is shown in Equation 4.1.  
{𝑚𝑎𝑥 [𝑅 = ∏ R𝑖
𝑠
𝑖=1
(x𝑖)] , 𝑚𝑖𝑛 [𝐶 = ∑ ∑ 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑚𝑖
𝑗=1
𝑠
𝑖=1
] , 𝑚𝑖𝑛 [𝑊 = ∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑚𝑖
𝑗=1
𝑠
𝑖=1
]}           (4.1) 
                                       
       subject to                    1 ≤ ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑚𝑖
𝑗=1 ≤ 𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑖   ∀ 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑠 
       𝑥𝑖𝑗  ∈ {0, 1, 2, … , 𝑠} 
where R, C, and W are the reliability, cost and weight of the system respectively, s is the number 
of modules, 𝑥𝑖𝑗  is quantity of 𝑗
𝑡ℎcomponent in module 𝑖, 𝑛max,𝑖   is user defined maximum 
number of components in parallel used in module 𝑖, 𝑚𝑖  is total number of available 
components for module 𝑖, 𝑅𝑖(x𝑖) is reliability of module 𝑖, 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝑐𝑖𝑗, 𝑤𝑖𝑗, are cost and weight 
for the 𝑗𝑡ℎ available component for module 𝑖 respectively.  
  
Figure 4-1 A general multilevel redundancy allocation configuration   
 
𝑈1  is the system  containing  𝑈11  to  𝑈1𝑛1  modules at its next lowest level. In a similar 
arrangement, the  𝑈11  module contains  𝑛11 sub-units as components at its next lowest level, 
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represented as  𝑈111 to  𝑈11𝑛11, which is truly the second hierarchical level of the system. The 
process can continuously be replicated logically until the actual lowest level of the system 
hierarchy is reached using connecting lines. The connecting lines logically indicate the 
relationship among the modules at different levels. It usually takes either series or parallel 
configurations or both, while all system levels provide reliability such that the reliability 
calculation takes into consideration the nature of the system configuration. In this case, to 
calculate reliability  𝑅𝑖 of system 𝑈1  for a multilevel series, system reliability can be achieved 
by; 
  
                 𝑅𝑖 = ∏ [1 − ∏(1 − 𝑅𝑖,𝑚
𝑗 )
𝑥𝑖
𝑗=1
]
𝑛𝑖
𝑚=1
                                                                             (4.2)   
Where,  𝑅𝑖,𝑚
𝑗
 are reliability values for sub-units  𝑈𝑖,𝑚
𝑗
 , a unit in the 𝑗 − 𝑡ℎ redundant unit of the 
𝑚 − 𝑡ℎ sub-sub unit of 𝑈𝑖. 𝑈𝑖 is the 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ unit (a common name for system, subsystem and 
component unit). 𝑥𝑖 is the number of components used in 𝑈𝑖, and  𝑛𝑖 represents the number of 
sub-units in 𝑈𝑖. Similarly, the reliability for a multi-level parallel system configuration can be 
calculated by:  
      𝑅𝑖 = 1 − ∏ [∏(1 − 𝑅𝑖,𝑚
𝑗 )
𝑥𝑖
𝑗=1
]
𝑛𝑖
𝑚=1
                                                                                             (4.3)   
The parameter definitions of  𝑛𝑖, 𝑥𝑖, 𝑅𝑖,𝑚
𝑗
 , in Equation 4.3 remain the same as in Equation 4.2. 
For the very lowest level of a multi-level system, which is usually the least system level where 
no additional system level exists, the reliability can be obtained by: 
101 
 
       𝑅𝑖 = 1 − ∏(1 − 𝑅𝑖,
𝑗)
𝑥𝑖
𝑗=1
                                                                                                          (4.4)     
A system cost is as important as system the reliability. Usually, most systems with higher 
reliability are subject to cost, and a total system cost is best appreciated if it stays within the 
system pre-defined cost value. System cost under RAP for simple systems is usually the 
summation of each component’s cost. For multi-level systems, additional costs are considered, 
and such cost consideration is normal as it reflects the existence of other levels (addition or 
duplication of redundant units) in the system. For this purpose, a pre-defined cost, alongside 
the total cost of system 𝑈𝑖 in a multi-level that can account for additional material cost can be 
computed.  
4.3 Multi-Level Formulation for a Series -Parallel System 
4.3.1 Motivation  
A series- parallel system reliability level is high and outperforms most other types of system 
configurations. For this reason, most industrial systems are currently designed in a series –
parallel form to enjoy ideal system reliability in both component and system levels. Multi-level 
formulation, as previously discussed, is usually subject to optimisation constraints hence, it 
clearly handles RAP to actualise reliability improvement without limitations on any level. The 
motivation for this work is to do something reasonably different from the usual traditional 
method in this interest area by establishing a realistic integrated design methodology to address 
complex engineering problems.  This is in contrast to traditional design methods concerning 
RAP, hence, all successful redundancy allocation work reported in the literature did not 
establish such integrated design methodology. One of the approaches to establish this method 
is through the use of MATLAB software tool which is widely used to solve most present 
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engineering problems. Details of MATLAB software tool functionalities with the user friendly 
manual is provided in Chapter five of this work, explaining what the program does, the tool 
and methodology used. 
4.3.2 Basic Multi-Level Formulation of Redundant System 
Modules  
A: Module. 
<n, m> :  Min/Max number of module components. 
 :  Module A1 with min/max components.  
 
    :   indicates the presence of system branch or sub-branch. 
For example, considering that redundant module A1 with defined minimum and maximum 
redundancy A1<1, 3> allocates its redundancies traditionally, the formulation will either be as 
follows: to have two components parallel to each other, and one independent series component. 
Alternatively, it can have all three maximum components in parallel, see Figure 4-2. 
                  
              Figure 4-2 System module A1 with three parallel components  
Hence the components are allocated in parallel, the reliability Equation for Figure 4-2 is 
therefore shown in Equation 4.5 in page 110 of this work. 
 
C1 
C1 
C1 
A <1, 3> 
A1 <1, 3> 
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The system module will function provided one of the components (C1) is working. For 
example, assuming the reliability of each components (C1) is 0.95, the overall reliability of 
the module can be calculated using Equation 4.5. 
 
There are however cases in which redundant modules (modules with components) may be 
associated with upper and lower levels as demonstrated in Figure 4-3, and in such a scenario 
the lower module can be treated as component.   
 
Figure 4-3 Components of modules A1 - A2 with associated upper module 
Figure 4-3 above shows a parallel allocation of components from modules A1 -A2 with its 
associated upper modules. The reason for the upper module is due to the presence of modular 
branch associated in A1-A2. This branch is indicated with upward arrow, and it is further 
developed using blue rectangular dotted lines to show that module A1-A2 with its associated 
upper modules belongs to a singular branch. The reliability Equation is the same as Equation 
4.3 shown earlier hence the module components are allocated in parallel, and it is beyond one 
level. Therefore, in order to maintain orderly Equation numbering, in page 110 of this work, 
this same Equation is referred to as Equation 4.6. 
A1 <1, 3> A2 <1, 2> 
C3 
C1 
C2 
C1 
C2 
C3 
C1 
C2 
C1 
C2 
  
<1, 2> 
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4.3.2.1  Series – Parallel System: A Case Study for a Typical Multi-Level 
Formulation 
 
Figure 4-4 A series- parallel system. 
The reliability of the system can be calculated using Equation 4.7 in page 110 of this work. 
Figure 4-4 above is a series- parallel system developed using MATLAB configuration code as 
shown below: 
The MATLAB configuration code of Figure 4-4:  
'A5<1,2>+((A1<1,3>+A2<1,2>)<1,2>*(A3<1,2>+(A7<1,2>+A6<1,2>)<1,2>+A4<1,3>))<1,
2>+A8<1,1>' .    
The MATLAB configuration code of Figure 4-4 above shows a system with various modules, 
branches, sub-branches and a specific maximum number of components each module can have 
using RBD method. RBD is a good method for the modelling and analysis of a system. 
From Figure 4-4, it shows the feasibility of allocating redundancy to multi-levels. The levels 
present on the system are: 
 Redundancy at module level 
 Redundancy at branch level without limitations on the number of levels 
 Redundancy at sub-branch (part of system branch) level. 
A1 <1, 3> A2 <1, 2> 
A3 <1, 2> A7 <1, 2> A6 <1, 2> A4 <1, 3> 
A5 <1, 2> A8 <1, 1> 
<1, 2> 
<1, 2> 
 <1, 2> 
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4.3.2.2  Analysis of the System Redundant Modules (A1-A8) 
System modules usually consist of a set of components. In this case, modules A1-A2 represent 
a full system branch, while modules A7-A6 represent part of a branch (sub-branch) of the 
system. Generally, the system consists of eight modules A1-A8 with redundancies. Each 
module selects components based on component availability and in accordance with 
configuration specifications. The configuration is made up of branches and a sub-branch (part 
of system branch), and each branch allocates redundancies in a similar way to that of modules 
(i.e., number of branches can be defined via components availability). 
For example, modules A2, A3, A5, A6 and A7 are redundant modules. However, each of these 
modules can only choose available components (<n, m>) between minimum of one and 
maximum of two <1, 2>, while redundant modules A1 and A4 are restricted to selecting 
components available between a minimum of one and maximum of three <1, 3>. 
Redundant module A8 is only allowed to make component choice between a minimum of one 
and maximum of one <1, 1>. In addition, the branches and sub-branch present in the system 
can only select one component between a minimum of one and a maximum of two <1, 2>. 
Whilst modules A5 and A8 are separately redundant for its module because the modules are 
part of the system, modules A1-A2 are redundant for the upper system branch. Modules A7-A6 
are redundant for the sub-branch located at the system lower branch, and the modules A3-A4 
are redundant for the full lower system branch. 
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4.3.2.3 Multi-Level Formulation for Module, Branches and Part of a 
Branch (Sub-branch)  
 
Figure 4-5 Defined Redundancies for modules, branches and part of branch (sub-branch) 
Figure 4-5 shows redundancies at three levels (Modules, branches and sub-branch). Modules 
A1-A8 as indicated with black rectangular discrete dotted lines signifies modular redundancy. 
Redundancy at branches and part of branch (sub-branch) without limitation is signified with 
red and blue rectangular dotted lines. 
The top most echelon of Figure 4-5, red dotted lines imply a full system branch with redundant 
modules A1-A2. This branch can only have redundant components chosen between a minimum 
of one and maximum of two <1, 2> as clearly indicated earlier in Figure 4-4. 
A1 <1, 3> A2 <1, 2> 
A1 <1, 3> A2 <1, 2> 
A3 <1, 2> 
A7 <1, 2> A6 <1, 2> 
A7 <1, 2> A6 <1, 2> 
A4 <1, 3> 
A5 <1, 2> 
A1 <1, 3> A2 <1, 2> 
A1 <1, 3> A2 <1, 2> 
A3 <1, 2> 
A7 <1, 2> A6 <1, 2> 
A7 <1, 2> A6 <1, 2> 
A4 <1, 3> 
A8 <1, 1> 
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Next to the top most branch, is redundant modules A7-A6. These modules are distinguished 
with another rectangular dotted red line, which in turn implies that modules A7-A6 are a sub-
branch (part of branch) to the systems lower branches. This distinction is necessitated to 
recognise Modules A3-A4 as members of the same system lower branch but not belong to the 
sub-branch (part of branch).  
A system branch precedes its sub-branches, and in most cases may have a discretely defined 
redundant component that supersedes a redundant component that is separately defined for its 
sub-branch without overlapping. Thus, in the above lower system branch of Figure 4-5 in 
discourse, there is no defined redundancy presence to base its component selection limits (i.e., 
minimum and maximum components in which the entire system lower branch should have). 
Rather, only its sub-branch has a defined redundancy of one as a minimum and two as a 
maximum <1, 2> as indicated in Figure 4-4 using the appropriate system/subsystem branch 
symbol (upward arrow) against modules A7-A6. 
Subsequently, the larger rectangular blue dotted lines show that modules A1-A2 and A7-A6 
which comprise branches and a sub-branch can only have the exact redundant components as 
defined in Figure 4-4. The defined redundancy is between one and two <1, 2>, and treated 
ideally as a branch based on the configuration. This was illustrated in Figure 4-5 above using 
rectangular blue dotted lines to indicate that it is a branch. And in Figure 4-6 overleaf, it shows 
that the branch has one as minimum, and two as maximum defined redundancies.   
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Figure 4-6 A Branch with maximum defined redundancy of two 
Figure 4-6 shows that redundant modules A1, A2, A3, A4, A6, and A7 have another branch level 
with defined redundancy of one and two <1, 2> as minimum and maximum components.  
However, for clarity purposes, similarity exists between Figures 4-5 and 4-6 above. But the 
significant differences between the two Figures are as follows; 
 Figure 4-5 detailed the system branches comprising (upper, lower and sub-branch) with 
defined redundancies for each, while 
 Figure 4-6 acknowledged the existence of the various branch levels. It additionally 
demonstrated that they belong to a singular branch. The branch redundant components 
is between a minimum of one and a maximum of two <1, 2> as shown in the typical 
multi- level redundancy allocation in Figure 4-7. 
A1 <1, 3> A2 <1, 2> 
A3 <1, 2> A7 <1, 2> A6 <1, 2> A4 <1, 3> 
A5 <1, 2> 
A3 <1, 2> A4 <1, 3> 
A8 <1, 1> 
<1, 2> 
<1, 2> 
A1 <1, 3> A2 <1, 2> 
A7 <1, 2> A6 <1, 2> 
<1, 2> 
<1, 2> 
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Figure 4-7 A Typical Multi level formulation 
A2 
A2 
A1 
A1 
A1 
A5 
A5 
A3 
A3 
A7 
A7 
A6 
A6 A4 
A4 
A4 
A7 
A7 
A6 
A6 
A8 
A2 
A2 
A1 
A1 
A1 
A2 
A2 
A1 
A1 
A1 
A3 
A3 
A7 
A7 
A6 
A6 A4 
A4 
A4 
A7 
A7 
A6 
A6 
A2 
A2 
A1 
A1 
A1 
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Figure 4-7 is a typical multi-level formulation of the configured system in Figure 4-4, and 
implemented in accordance with Figure 4-6 analysis, which has in overall a branch with 
maximum defined redundancies of two. 
In addition to Figure 4-7, module A1- A2 represents a full system branch with defined modular 
redundancies properly allocated. Whilst modules A7-A6 a represents sub-branch (part of branch) 
with defined modular redundancies allocated properly, modules A5 and A8 are the system 
series independent modules.  
Reliability Equations for 4-2 to 4-4 are as follows: 
The reliability Equation for Figure 4-2 is Equation 4.5 below. 
       𝑅𝑖 = 1 − ∏(1 − 𝑅𝑖,
𝑗)
𝑛𝑖
𝑗=1
                                                                                                               4.5   
The reliability Equation for Figure 4-3 is the same as Equation 4.3 earlier discussed. Here, it is 
referred to as Equation 4.6 for the purpose of numbering orderliness. 
      𝑅𝑖 = 1 − ∏ [∏(1 − 𝑅𝑖,𝑚
𝑗 )
𝑥𝑖
𝑗=1
]
𝑛𝑖
𝑚=1
                                                                                             (4.6) 
 
The reliability Equation for Figure 4-4 is below: 
       𝑅𝑠 = 1 − [∏ (1 − ∏(1 − 𝑅𝑖,𝑚
𝑗 )
𝑥𝑖
𝑗=1
)
𝑛𝑖
𝑚=1
]                                                                                     4.7 
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4.4 Chapter Summary 
In summary, redundancy allocation problems were traditionally implemented on systems 
sequentially. In this chapter redundancy allocation problems are extensively explored and 
analysed at all levels, with specific mathematical formulations adopted for reliability 
calculations for each system level. 
The author demonstrated the feasibility of allocating redundancy beyond the usual traditional 
approach to an integrated approach. The newly established approach which showed no 
limitation on either levels (i.e., components, module, branch, sub-branch and system) was 
actualised in MATLAB software tool. In the following chapter five, to be specific, the author 
provides a user friendly manual to explain both the operations and functionalities of the 
MATLAB software tool. The chapter also features a case study detailing how a series-parallel 
system was configured in line with a modern way of coding for each system level. A three 
dimensional Pareto frontier results with the respective project objectives such as cost, failure 
rate and weight are also shown and analysed in each of the dimensions.  
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5. Software Development 
 
This developed software program was achieved in MATLAB environment, and stored in a main 
directory called Multi-level, Multi-Objective Redundancy optimisation (MLMOR2). The 
program is developed to run very fine in all the case studies used in this project having the 
correct data. Therefore, at first, when the user loads the main directory it sequentially locates 
other directories whose individual functions vary from one another but are collectively 
channelled towards delivering the program objectives; 
 Pareto front analysis with cost, weight and FR as objectives 
 Integrated redundancy allocation, in which two cases dealing with different topology 
level are shown and analysed in Figures 5-7 and 5-8. 
5.1 Program Formulation 
The formulated MATLAB program was achieved with respect to its objectives. It was 
subsequently portioned by creating directories for each program milestone. Some tasks did 
require simultaneous approach. Directories created, when loaded by the main directory, locate 
each other sequentially. This led to consistent debugging practice on each directory in order to 
have the program run successfully. The entire directories created for this program, as well as 
the activities of each of these directories, are detailed in the modular structure of the software 
shown in Figure 5-1 below. 
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Figure 5-1 Modular structure of the software. 
5.2 Main Directory (MLMOR2) 
The main directory contains other directories created for this program. Therefore, when the 
user loads the main directory; it sequentially locates (MLMOR2_project) as one of the sub 
directories contained in the main directory.  
START 
MLMOR2_Show front 
 MLMOR2_show 
Pareto front 
MAIN DIRECTORY 
MLMOR2 
MLMOR2_Config.Manipulatn 
 MLMOR2_AddElm2Config. 
 MLMOR2_ReConfig. 
MLMOR2_Evaluatn 
 MLMOR2_Gen_VEGA 
 MLMOR2_Gen_NSGA-II 
 MLMOR2_First_Front 
 
MLMOR2_GA 
 MLMOR2_ initial Populatn. 
 MLMOR2_Parent Selectn. 
 MLMOR2_CO 
 MLMOR2_Mute 
MLMOR2_Project 
 MLMOR2_sys 01 
 MLMOR2_sys 02 
 MLMOR2_project 
 MLMOR2_Config. 
 MLMOR2_Evaluatn  
 MLMOR2_GA 
 MLMOR2_Show front 
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5.2.1 MLMOR2_Project 
Upon location of the MLMOR2_project, it does the following; 
 Sets GA optimisation parameters (i.e., npop, ngen, pc and pm) 
 Sets the generated initial population 
 Produces results in Pareto frontier through efficient application of two multi-objective 
solution techniques vector evaluated genetic algorithm and non-dominated sorted 
genetic algorithm (VEGA and NSGA-II). Upon the solution, the decision maker (DM) 
can then make an informed decision in accordance with the prioritised objective(s); cost, 
weight and failure rate (FR). In this case, they can either be single or multi-objective. 
Refer to Figures 5-2 and 5-3 for the solutions. 
5.2.2 MLMOR2_ConfigurationManipulation 
When this directory is sequentially located, it automatically does the following; 
 Sets the system configuration parameters such as the entire components availability 
meant for each modules at various system levels. 
 Selects and sets the minimum and maximum components for each module from the list 
of component availability. 
 Allocates the exact required redundancies for each of the system level: 
(i) Module 
(ii) Branch 
(iii) Sub-branch without limitation. 
 Updates the location of each system branch in the simplified configuration. Please refer to 
Figures 5-7 and 5-8 for the solutions showing the overall system topologies in two cases.  
5.2.3 MLMOR2_Evaluation 
The evaluation directory evaluates and sets the NSGA-II and VEGA selection techniques 
adopted. Whilst the VEGA technique sets the selection process based on roulette wheel, the 
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NSGA-II techniques sets the selection based on tournament and enhances a better spread of 
solutions. Therefore, when the user loads the evaluation directory, it does the following. 
 Sorts the index of the optimisation solutions accordingly (i.e., either in ascending or 
descending other in readiness for good solution output) 
 Sets the different ranks in the population indicating different fronts where each of the 
objectives will be displayed for adequate decision making. In this case, the objectives 
are failure rate, cost and weight. 
 Sets the defined crowding distances for each solution such that the solutions are well 
spread for analysis without overlapping. 
5.2.4 MLMOR2_GA 
The GA directory does the following; 
 Generates and sets the initial population for the multi-level, multi-
objective redundancy optimisation. 
 Sets the defined new methods of chromosome definition that enables 
combination of building blocks at various system levels 
 Generates the VEGA and NSGA-II selection parameters  
 Sets the mutation and crossover configurations. 
5.2.5 MLMOR2_Show Front 
This directory does the following: 
 Sets the solutions in three dimensions in the Pareto front. 
 Sets each of the objectives in one of the dimensions in the Pareto front as depicted in 
Figures 5-2 and 5-3.  
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5.2.6 Results Analysis of FR, Weight and Cost objectives 
                                         
    Figure 5-2 First Pareto front multi-objective solutions in three dimensions (3-D) 
                                                                 
  Figure 5-3 Second Pareto multi-objective solutions in three dimensions (3-D)  
These results above are the product of the configured system discussed earlier in Figure 4-4, 
and are now displayed in Pareto front. The red and blue dots which appears in both cross and 
star signs represents the objectives (FR, cost and weight) solution. Both the first and the second 
Pareto fronts has the same objectives function. However, for the first Pareto front, the minimum 
and maximum cost are different from the second Pareto front. Whilst the first Pareto front cost 
range is measured at interval of ten, the second Pareto front cost range is measured at twenty.  
All the solutions are considered good, but the best solution point on the Pareto front depends 
on which objective is given priority. Since the system objectives are carefully taken into 
consideration during the design stage and met the design goals, it is imperative that the decision 
maker, where necessary, collaborates with relevant stakeholders to identify and prioritise 
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criteria associated with design goal. Priority can be to have a minimum FR of the system, 
minimum system cost and maximum system weight. Alternatively, priority may be to have the 
weight and failure rate of the system minimised. These solutions further zoomed increasingly 
in order to have two dimensional Pareto front for proper analysis of two objectives as showed 
in Figures 5-4, 5-5 and 5-6.                                                                        
          
        Figure 5-4 Pareto front showing best FR solution in 2-D 
 
1.6x10^-3  
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               Figure 5-5 Pareto front showing best cost solution in 2-D 
 
                  
               Figure 5-6 Pareto front showing best cost solution in 2-D 
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5.2.7 Generated System Topology of Cases I and II               
5.2.7.1 System Topology Case I: 
 x17+((x3*x4+x8)*(x16+(x23+x14)+x12*x13))*((x3*x4+x8)*(x15+(x23+x14)+x13))+x20 
 
Figure 5-7 Case I: generic topology of the system 
 
Result Analysis of case I. 
This case represents a realistic integrated redundancies allocated, and the topology of the 
system under integrated redundancy allocation. As shown in Figure 5-7 above the result is a 
product of the system configuration discussed earlier in Figure 4-4 which was implemented in 
the MATLAB environment. From the result, it is a series-parallel system comprising branches, 
sub-branch, modules and components. The system has three branches parallel to each other. 
One of the branches, the third (lower branch) to be precise, has a sub-branch. In overall, each 
of the system branches has modules with parallel components (i.e., comprising upper and lower 
levels) to increase branch reliability.  
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The systems first and last modules with components are x17 and x20. The top branch comprises 
three modules consisting of components (x3, x4 and x8). Modules with components x3 and x4 
are in parallel to each other, but in series to module with component x8. The middle branch 
comprises of five modules consisting of components (x16, x23, x14, x12 and x13). Module 
with components x12 and x13 are in parallel to each other, and have higher reliability. This is 
because it will require both components to fail before the module fails. While modules with 
components x16, x23 and x14 are in series, in overall the branch is connected in series, it 
therefore fails if any of the branch modules fail. The lower branch has a sub-branch. The upper 
branch has (x3, x4 and x8) modules. Module with component x8 is less reliable and in series 
to more reliable modules with components x3 and x4. The lower branch has modules consisting 
of components (x15, x23, x14 and x13) which are in series to one another. The upper and lower 
modules with their corresponding components that make up the system lower branch are 
parallel to each other, thereby making the branch very reliable. The branch fails if all the 
redundancies created in both upper and lower branches fail. From the Figure, it can be 
concluded that the system is reliable because it has good number of redundancies presents in 
all the branches and can perform efficiently. 
5.2.7.2 System Topology Case II: 
x18*x18+((x1*x1*x1*x2+x9*x6*x7)*(x15*x15+(x23+x14)+x12*x10))*((x4*x2*x4*x1*x3
+x8*x7*x8)*(x15*x16+(x21*x21+x14)+x12*x12))+x20 
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For this case, it also represents a realistic integrated redundancies allocated, and the topology 
of the system under integrated redundancy allocation. As shown in Figure 5-8 above, case II 
has a higher topology as compared to case I due to presence of more redundancies allocated on 
the system branches. However, both cases I and II, are product of the same system 
configuration discussed earlier in Figure 4-4 which was implemented in the MATLAB 
environment. Again, case II is a Series-parallel system comprising of full system branches and 
a sub-branch located in the lower branch as shown in the architectural topology. From the 
Figure, modules (x18 and x18) which are in parallel to each other, but in series to the entire 
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Figure 5-8 Case II: generic topology of the system 
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system branches, and the system terminates with an independent series module consisting of 
component (x20).   
From the top system branch, redundant modules (x1, x1, x1, x2, x2, x9, x6, and x7) are 
allocated in parallel. However, modules consisting of components (x1, x1, x1, x2) and (x2, x9, 
x6, x7) each are in series to each other.  
From the system middle branch, modules with two identical components (x15 and x15) are in 
parallel to each other, modules with components (x23 and x14) are in series. Modules 
consisting two un-identical components (x12 and x10) are again in parallel to each other. 
However, all of these modules with their components allocated to this branch are all in series 
to the system middle branch. 
The system lower branch is made up of an upper and lower branches. From the upper branch, 
five modules consisting of components (x4, x2, x4, x1 and x3) are separately in parallel. This 
same scenario is applicable to module with components (x8, x7 and x8) in the same upper 
branch. These components are connected in parallel to provide high reliability to the system 
branch. From its lower branch, two un-identical components (x15 and x16) are in parallel to 
each other. Also, modules with identical components such as (x21 and x21) and (x12 and x12) 
are connected in parallel to each other, while modules with un-identical components (x16 and 
x14) are connected in series.  In comparison, Case II has higher topology and higher reliability 
levels than case I due to presence of strategic redundancies created and can outperform case I. 
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5.3 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presents the usability of the MATLAB software tool used in this work with its 
functionalities explained. The author did show that it is a prolific software tool for technical 
project delivery. From the project conceptual stage, particularly projects involving Series-
Parallel systems, the tool enabled the designer to configure design candidates in accordance 
with specification to produce the desired output. In this case, desired outputs were shown in 
two phases: 
 Showing system topology levels with integrated allocated redundant components which 
outweighs the traditional design approach on Redundancy allocation problem  
 Showing the multi-objective results on the Pareto frontier for decision making. 
The program works efficiently well, especially as it only requires minimum run time. This 
method of system configuration using MATLAB software tool can be adopted in various 
engineering fields to optimise or backup a system for reliability purposes. In fact, in the 
following chapter Six, this successful MATLAB software tool is also used for the configuration 
analysis of case studies. 
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6. Case Studies 
 
This chapter addresses couple of the thesis case studies and compared the results of the 
proposed approach with other approaches mostly adopted in optimal redundancy allocation 
practice. The systems under consideration are multilevel system and a fuel oil system. Prior to 
this work, no Suitable codes representing the various systems were provided. However, apart 
from comparing the optimal solutions of the multilevel system, suitable codes for the various 
systems were provided. With respect to the oil fuel pump system, the proposed method 
specifically targeted to make the system more redundant, and provided suitable codes 
representing the new redundant fuel oil system. Figure 6-1 below is a series system showing 
maximum redundancy configuration for 𝑈1 consisting three blocks  𝑈11, 𝑈12 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑈13 at the 
second level. 
 
Figure 6-1 Multilevel reliability system 
The system level can further be configured without limitation. To achieve this, the author first 
renamed the system from 𝑈1  to System A, alongside with its blocks from ( 𝑈11 −
𝑈132) 𝑡𝑜 (𝐴1 − 𝐴10) without altering the original configuration. The reality of this new name 
is shown in the Figure overleaf: 
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Figure 6-2 is subsequently codified in MATLAB programming environment to show the 
solution of this system in code version. One of the advantages of a codified solution is that it 
is quite flexible to adopt to improve system levels without limitation. MATLAB configuration 
helps not only in defining the exact number of components a block should have, but also 
specifying the number of branches that exist in each block. In fact, it is a more convenient 
approach to design and redesign a system to any level. Because MATLAB is an effective design 
tool and several programs with different approaches can be implemented, it is therefore 
important to specify that NSGA-II is applied to codify solutions of these blocks.   
The configuration showed the possibility of a system block having un-identical components in 
series but uses identical components in parallel to increase the block required maximum level, 
as depicted in Figure 6-3.  
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 
System A 
Figure 6-2 Renamed multi-level reliability system of Figure 6-1 
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Figure 6-3 excludes from consideration a suitable code capable of improving the block levels 
to any level of choice (Multi-level) without losing performance efficiency. Systems with multi-
level have better performance efficiency because of the wider feasible design space it occupies. 
The more design space a system has, the more efficient it performs. GA do not have much 
feasible design space because it reduces feasible design space in the course of transforming 
hierarchical design variables into a one dimensional array. In addition, the development can 
have an adverse effect on the GA overall performance such that GA may fail to get superior 
solutions that exist just outside its feasible design space.   
GA configuration leads to performance deficiency as a result of the feasible design space 
restriction.  However, such a restriction problem was to a certain extend addressed using 
Hierarchical Genetic Algorithm (HGA). HGA provided a better feasible design that permits 
possible combination of multi-level redundancy allocation. This is contrary with the GA 
configuration scheme that does not allow redundancy at two levels simultaneously as evident 
in Figure 6-3. HGA configuration scheme allows redundancy at two levels simultaneously as 
Figure 6-3 Maximum redundancy level using GA  
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shown in Figure 6-4, and therefore has the tendency to outperform conventional GA 
considering it has more design space to yield a better solution. 
      
 
One of the shortcomings with HGA configuration is the lack of flexibility to increase any part 
of the system levels beyond allowing redundancy at two levels simultaneously, which is one 
of the novelties achieved in this project using NSGA-II.      
6.1 NSGA-II Code Solutions of the above Configuration 
Obtained Earlier with GA and HGA. 
Codified solution versions of Figures 6-2, 6-3 and 6-4 respectively are presented in the form 
of cases. Each case clearly handled each Figure obtained from the case study and is therefore 
presented accordingly. 
Case 1: codified solution of Figure 6-2. 
Figure 6-2 is made up of three blocks with redundant modules (A1-A10).  
Block 1 has redundant modules (A1-A4), Block 2 has redundant modules (A5-A6) and Block 
3 has the remaining redundant modules (A7-A10). Codes for each of these blocks are shown 
overleaf: 
Figure 6-4 Maximum redundancy level using HGA  
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(A1<1,1>+A2<1,1>*(A3<1,2>+A4<1,1>))   +A5<1,1>+A6<1,2>+ 
                    
           (A7<1,1>+A8<1,2>*(A9<1,2>+ A10<1,1>)). 
 
 
6.2 Code Solution Analysis of Figure 6-2 
The code accordingly defined exact redundant modules belonging to each block alongside their 
branches. For block 1, the code showed that four modules (A1- A4) and two branches (upper 
and lower) exist. The upper branch has modules A1-A2 linked in series and each of the modules 
can only have one component, while the lower branch also has redundant modules A3-A4. The 
modules located at block 1 lower branch are more redundant because module A3 can have a 
maximum of two components in parallel while the A4 module is restricted to have one single 
component. It therefore requires both components in module A3 to fail simultaneously for   the 
module to be in a failed state.  
For block 2, there are only two redundant modules (A5-A6). Module A5 can only have one 
single component while module A6 can have two components maximum, and these 
components can be visibly seen in parallel in block 2. 
Block 3 has two branches as clearly shown in the configuration with a total number of four 
modules (A7-A10) in the upper and lower branches.  It will not be out of order to agree that the 
branches have equal reliability strength considering that both the lower level and the higher 
level branches have one module each in parallel. The upper modules of the block are A7-A8. 
Block 2 Block 1 
Block 3 
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The configuration showed that A7 can neither have more than one component nor can A8 have 
more than two components. This is applicable to the lower branch of the system of the block 
with modules (A9-A10). Module A9 can only have two parallel components maximum, while 
module A10 cannot have more than one component.  
The entire system fails if either of the blocks fails completely, because series system blocks are 
dependent on the other in order to function. 
As stated earlier, the system level can be expanded to multi-level without limitation to all of 
the system levels. Block 1 can be expanded to any level of choice through technical 
modification of the system code. For example, new block 1 configuration that is aimed at only 
expanding the block branch to a new level of choice becomes;  
(A1<1, 1>+A2<1,1>*(A3<1,2>+A4<1,1>))<1,n>.  
 
The solution to this code when the parameter n =2 is presented in Figure 7-5 
The parameters such as m, n and p, used to technically modify the codes, represent the 
number of levels desired. This can be from the components levels down to the system levels. 
Therefore, they vary in terms of numbers from one to infinity. In other words, the parameters 
vary from a single level to multi-level. 
 
 
 
 
New Block 1 code  
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                                                                 (A1<1, 1>+A2<1,1>*(A3<1,2>+A4<1,1>))<1,2>. 
 
 
 
 
Case 2: codified solution of Figure 6-3 
(A1<1,1>+A2<1,1>A3<1,1>)<1,n>.  
As earlier stated, parameter n is the maximum number of redundant branches the block can 
attain. If parameter n =10, then the block level rises from the present single level to the 
specified level ten which will actually yield better reliability performance. 
Case 3: codified solution of Figure 6-4 
(A1<1,1>+A2<1,m>+A3<1,n>)<1,p>. A typical solution to this code is Figure 6-4 when the 
design parameters m=2, n=2 and p=2. 
Case 4: codified solution of MLMOR shown in Figure 6-6 overleaf. 
((A1<1,1>+A2<1,m>+A3<1,n>)<1,p>*(A1<1,1>+A2<1,1>+A3<1,1>)*(A1<1,1> 
+A2<1,1>+A3<1,1>)) 
Figure 6-5 Expanded block 1 level when Parameter n =2 
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Thus, solution to the code is shown below and it can be consistently applied to improve the 
system to any level. In addition, it can express the exact internal and external structure with 
both series and parallel linkages.  
 
 
The solution showed branches (lowest, middle and upper) present in the block and each of 
these block levels can separately be improved without causing adverse effect on other block 
levels. This is because NSGA-II does not need vector transformation, the feasible design space 
is normally not affected, and this leads to better reliability performance. From the solution, the 
block FR has been handled in a manner that results into effective reliability performance on 
the block. Interestingly, the improved reliability gotten using NSGA-II code was achieved 
without incurring any additional material or components costs. In higher reliability applications, 
this is a fundamental milestone because even very small improvements in system reliability are 
usually difficult to achieve.  
NSGA-II was subsequently applied to optimize multilevel series redundancy allocation 
problems with distinct configurations referred to as problem A and problem B respectively as 
shown below in Figures 6-7 and 6-8. These problems have levels, problem A contains three 
levels whilst problem B contains four levels.      
Figure 6-6 Solution of MLMOR using NSGA-II 
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         Figure 6-7 Problem A: a three multilevel system  
 
                                
 
              Figure 6-8 Problem-B: a four multilevel system       
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The candidate compared the NSGA-II result obtained with that of convectional GA and HGA 
to show that NSGA-II performance is better, especially with respect to assessing influence of 
cost constraints upon optimal solutions as shown in Figures 6-9 and 6-10. These Figures 
demonstrate that the optimal solution produced with the proposed NSGA-II approach is far 
better than the solutions produced by both conventional GA and Hierarchal GA under the same 
computational environment.  
 
Figure 6-9 Optimal Solution for problem – A obtained using GA, HGA and NSGA-II (proposed 
method). 
Twenty (19) cases were examined for Problem A (a 3-level) in order to assess the influence of 
cost constraints upon optimal solution. Ten 400 generation trials were performed using each 
algorithm type to trace the best solution in each of these ten-trail set, and the best solution of 
the ten-trial set was chosen as the optimal solution in each of these cases as shown in Figure 6-
9. In like manner as above, 15 cases for problem B (a 4-level) system was also examined for 
the same purpose of assessing the influence of cost constraint upon optimal solution, using 
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again ten 400 generation trials. The below Figure depicts best optimal solution chosen for the 
ten cases considered. 
 
Figure 6-10 Optimal Solution for problem – B obtained using GA, HGA and NSGA-II. 
RBD showing best GA, HGA and NSGA-II solutions for problem A with three levels is shown 
in Figures 6-10.1, 6-10.2 and 6-10.3 respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                     Figure 6-10.1 -Best solution of GA 
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      Figure 6-10.2 –Best solution of HGA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
       Figure 6-10.3 Best solution of the proposed method (NSGA-II). 
 
RBD showing best GA, HGA and NSGA-II solutions for problem B with Four levels is 
shown below in Figures 6-10.4, 6-10.5 and 6-10.6 respectively.  
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       System A1 
 
 
 
 
           
     Figure 6-10.4 best solution of GA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
Figure 6-10.5 best solution of HGA  
  
 
 
          
 
       
   Figure 6-10.6 best solution of the proposed method (NSGA-II) 
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As explained earlier the RBD results shows that the proposed method can have more 
redundancies at two levels simultaneously which is why it has optimal reliability performance.   
6.3 Fuel Oil System Case Study 
To further demonstrate the application of design optimisation in practice, the author applied 
the optimisation capabilities of reliability block diagram alongside with this project written 
codes to a manually optimised fuel oil service system for a cargo ship, as shown in Figure 6-
11 
 
Figure 6-11 Fuel oil system-Manually optimised (Yiannis, P. et al., 2011) 
Oil is pumped to the system service tanks and flows through to the mixing tanks. The mixing 
tanks collect circulated oil and also acts as reserve tanks hence it supplies fuel when service 
tanks are empty. The fitted flow meters indicate fuel consumption while the booster pumps are 
responsible in pumping the oil through the heaters which heats the oil. The viscosimeters 
control the system fuel oil temperature in order to provide accurate viscosity for combustion. 
High pressured fuel is discharged through the circulation pumps. Indicator filters prevent 
particles in the oil from entering the engine. Whilst the main engine is usually operated in 
accordance with manufacturer’s instructions to manoeuvre on heavy fuel oil, automatic filters 
provides full-flow fine filtration of heavy fuel oil. Since the objectives are to minimise the 
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system failure rate and increase the reliability through components replication on each of the 
subsystems, it is therefore unnecessary to further expatiate on the system functionalities. To 
realise the objectives will originally lead to a rise in the system topology level to a multilevel 
as against the base design with low minimal component replications as shown in Figure 6-11. 
Failure of this system leads to loss of engine propulsion and can possibly result in the ship 
becoming grounded as a result of drifting. To minimise this system failure rate, the candidate 
optimised the system as shown in Figure 6-12 and annotated the subsystems using A1-A10, to 
represent various components for easy system analysis. The system components replication did 
not consider the main engine component (A6) because the main engine is immutable. The 
remaining replication was done in accordance with the NSGA-II codes specification and can 
over time be validated to any level without restrictions. 
 
Figure 6-12 Fuel oil system-Optimised design using NSGA-II to Multilevel 
139 
 
Annotations: A1- Service tanks, A2- booster pumps, A3- automatic filters, A4- flow meters, 
A5-mixing tanks, A6-main engine (not replicated), A7-indicator filters, A8- circulation pumps, 
A9- heaters, A10- viscosimeters.  
The code for the above system is shown and analyse below as: 
'((A1<1,4>*A2<1,4>+A3<1,4>+A4<1,4>)*A5<1,4>*(A6<1,1>+A7<1,2>*A8<1,3>+A9<1,
3>*A10<1,2>))<1,n>'  Where parameter n=2. 
After replicating the subsystems, the overall system was equally replicated to a higher level in 
order to perform optimally in case of failure on one branch. The two branches, upper and lower 
branches, provide optimal performance and are highly reliable due to additional parallel 
redundancies allocated appropriately on the subsystem. The code clearly specified the 
maximum allowable number of components each of the system’s subsystems can have. For 
service tanks, booster pumps, automatic filters, flow meters and the mixing tanks the maximum 
allowable components is between one and four. For indicator filters and viscosimeters 
subsystems, the maximum allowable components each can accommodate is between one and 
two. For circulation pumps and heaters, the maximum allowable components for their 
respective subsystems are between one and three. Whilst the main engine was not replicated 
because, it is immutable as afore-said. The maximum topology level the system can attain in 
line with the code is two since parameter n in the code is between one and two. The system 
topology levels increases with increase in parameter n. In addition, the cost and FR of the 
components that make up the system in Figure 6-12 are shown in Table 6.1. The data was not 
made use of in this chapter as the author only targeted to create more redundancies on the 
system. However, the data can be employed for extensive cost and FR analysis of this system 
with respect to each alternative.  
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Table 6.1- Alternative cost and failure rate attributes for components of the fuel oil (Yiannis,  
P. et al., 2011). 
  Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3 
Components Cost  Failure 
Rate 
Cost Failure 
Rate 
Cost Failure 
Rate 
Indicator filter 1500 5.00E-07 2500 2.00E-07 3222 1.00E-07 
Viscosimeter 2500 2.50E-07 3178 1.00E-06 3814 5.00E-07 
Heater 2000 6.70E-07 2505 5.00E-06 3956 1.00E-06 
Circulation ump 6000 3.20E-05 13380 2.00E-05 18000 7.00E-06 
Mixing tank 2000 1.60E-05 2963 8.00E-06 4444 2.00E-06 
Flow meter 2000 1.00E-05 3000 1.00E-06 4444 5.00E-07 
Automatic filter 2000 1.00E-05 2647 5.00E-06 3529 1.00E-06 
Booster pump 5000 3.20E-05 10682 2.00E-05 12500 5.00E-06 
Service tank 1500 1.60E-05 1957 5.00E-06 2739 1.00E-06 
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6.4 Chapter Summary              
In this chapter, the written NSGA-II codes were technically applied on two case studies 
involving a multilevel reliability system, and a fuel oil system, in order to further optimise and 
analyse these systems. For the fuel oil system, the objective was simply to minimised the 
system FR through allocation of more redundancies to the system components and modules. 
Afterwards, because the value of the parameter ‘n’ in the code, which represents branch level 
was 2, an additional system branch was achieved and this resulted in a high increase in the 
systems overall topology in accordance with code configuration validated against the fuel oil 
system. For the multilevel reliability system, the original system configuration was transformed 
to suit the research method of system configuration. Each of blocks (modules)  in the system 
was idetified and subsequently analysed. Given that, a codified solution version of the system 
was realise and the NSGA-II results were optimal than a conventional GA and HGA results. 
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7. Summary and Critical 
Appraisal 
 
7.1 Summary of Achievements and Original Contributions 
The following achievements will assist accelerate the research on redundancy allocation 
problems:  
 Integrated performance –reliability allocation method with the proposed NSGA-II 
optimisation algorithm can be applied as  a realistic decision making tool to accurately 
estimate optimal topology and reliability of a system. This is proven possible for 
repairable systems by simply ensuring that an appropriate system configuration and 
selection of  appropriate components combination from the available choice of 
components is implemented.  
 Integrated performance –reliability allocation method, in line with the formulated 
optimisation problem, can realistically calculate various reliability levels of a multi-
level system, alongside, with their associated constraints such as cost, weight and FR.  
 Considering the choice of various system designs and the task to appropriately select 
components for each sub-system, the adoption of this  integrated design methodolgy  is 
very handy for identification and selection of optimal system topology from all 
available choices. Analysis of Figure 5.7 and 5.8 with different topologies are one of 
the practical topology results produced through this method. These results can assist  
reliability engineers during the analysis and identification of various competing system 
topolgies with the view to ascertain their reliability with respect to system total cost. 
 Apart from the new formulation method, the flexibility of the written codes can be 
easily validated or configured  to solve problems involving any typical real-life system 
with multi-level and complex arrangement. 
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 Also during search period, the code functions does not converge prematurly in any 
search space region, it rather produces a feasible solution. Unlike the conventional GA, 
it further introduces multi-directional search diversity in the solution space and can 
improve the chances to ractify the shortfall in conventional GA.  
Additionally, with respect to the reproduction operators (Mutation and Crossover), new 
reproduction operators with  special characteristics to combine building blocks at 
different levels and mutate a solution at various levels were defined.  
7.2 Critical Appraisal  
The present research concentrated largely to produce quality and acceptable results concerning 
RAP. However, it has not completely addressed all the possible challenges in this area. 
Challenges such as:  
 To investigate the performance of the model using empirical data derived from the real 
manufacturers. Especially as data model used in this work was simply analytical in 
nature. It will in extension, be a beneficial practice to evaluate and estimate values for 
the parameters of the model, such as the feasibility factor and the maximum component 
reliability, from real data and through consultation with design engineers of 
components and systems for which an application is undertaken. 
 All though two good case studies were successfully carried out in this research. 
However, more industrial case studies needs to be delivered considering limited 
industrial case studies reported to have been carried out in the literature.   
7.3 Future work 
The concept of using this proposed integrated performance- reliability optimisation approach 
is not far advanced on many systems. The next step will be to advance this approach in the 
following systems: 
 non-repairable systems 
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 Bridge network and Parallel –Series systems in order to promote and encourage the use 
of this method.  
 To make the approach more attractive and less difficult by developing a simplified 
codes version with probably more functionalities for industrial commercialisation. The 
present research showed a very difficult process requiring in-depth knowledge of 
system analysis. This may be unattractive for prospective researchers in this area to 
painstakingly go through, prior to getting optimal solutions. The simpler and effective 
a system optimisation model is, the better and attractive it becomes.  
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